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METHODOLOGICAL MISCONCEPTIONS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Rethinking social thought and social processes
by Angelo Fusari
Men  are  strange  beings  indeed!…  I  would 
admire them, but what do I see?  Sophism, a 
meaningless sophism that blinds them to the 
evidence  and paralyses  them in  front  of  an 
open door. Perhaps the main defect of men is 
their mental inertness, which enables them to 
achieve  the  most  admirable  developments 
based on well established notions rather than 
to  engage  in  (methodical) criticism  and 
revision of the foundations
   Bruno  De  Finetti,  Un  matematico  e  
l’economia, Franco  Angeli,  Milan,  1969, 
p.33)
Back cover
This book offers a systematic view of social analysis that will advance the communication of results 
between different academic disciplines. It overcomes misunderstandings that are due to the use of 
an unstructured variety of methodological traditions in the analysis of complex socioeconomic and 
political processes. The book focuses on the special features of human society: humans as subjects, 
non-repetitiveness and irreversibility of social actions, and the peculiar relations between necessity 
and possibility in human action. It defines methodological criteria, procedures and rules that enable 
researchers  to  select  and  classify  realistic  hypotheses  to  derive  general  principles  and  basic 
organizational  features.  It  then  applies  these  criteria  in  critical  reviews  of  major  theories  and 
interpretations of society and history, offering clarifications and alternative proposals with regard to 
crucial aspects of anthropological, political, juridical, sociological, and religious thought.
This volume:
• Offers a thorough and detailed critique of scientific methodology in the social sciences.
• Lines out a consistent methodological approach for the social sciences.
• Extends social analysis to the field of ethical structures. 
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Preface
 Contemporary social teaching suffers from a grave deficiency: it is lacking rules of methodology 
and procedure suited to social reality that are, in particular, able to reconcile increasing creativity 
(implying irreversibility) with rationality, which are indispensable for the scientific judgement of 
theoretical ideas. Unfortunately, this lack is largely ignored, and eminent social scholars have even 
explicitly and emphatically theorized a rejection of method. This allows rhetorical and literary skills 
to  prevail  over  the  reasons  of  science,  thereby  promoting  a  deceptive  instead  of  constructive 
pluralism,  confusion  in  the  study  of  contemporary  societies  and  growing  ineptitude  in  their 
government, what represents a main source of afflictions in the present world. 
    Our long-lasting  studies  on  the  organization  and the  vicissitudes  of  human  societies  made 
increasingly evident the poverty of the current methods of inquiry on society.This book intends to 
react against such poverty. It is complementary to a previous volume, Economic theory and social  
change1,  and extends the analysis to other branches of social thought and to the interpretation of 
history.  Unlike  the  earlier  book,  however,  the  present  work  makes  extremely  limited  use  of 
mathematical formalization and other technical complications and obscurities; this is intended to 
foster easier and broader understanding of its contents and to facilitate the diffusion of studies of 
method outside the hermeneutics of a restricted elite.  The present book has also been preceded by 
one substantial study of historical processes,2 and another focused on the problem of power,3 both 
published  in  Italian.  These  works  confirmed  our  conviction  that  the  advancement  of  social 
knowledge  is  severely  hindered  by  some  methodological  misconceptions  concerning  the 
1 See H. Ekstedt and A. Fusari, Economic theory and social science. Routledge 2010, London-New York
2 See A. Fusari (2000),  Human adventure. An inquiry on the ways of people and civilizations.  Edizioni SEAM, Rome. 
This study starts from primitive societies and embraces the great Asian and Mediterranean empires and societies, Arab 
civilization, European Feudal and Medieval societies and the Renaissance, through to the beginning of the eighteenth 
century.
3See A. Fusari (2008) Reason and dnomination. Ethics, politics and economics in modern global society, Marco 
Editore, Cosenza
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characteristics of social reality and that those same misconceptions also afflict the interpretation of 
history. The situation seems to be worse and, in a sense, more difficult and troublesome than that 
afflicting the natural sciences before the methodological revolution of the seventeenth century. If 
this is indeed so, it is urgent to clear these misconceptions up. 
Method is a two-edged sword: it offers powerful assistance in and enhances our capability of 
understanding and solving the problems of everyday life; but if the chosen method is inappropriate, 
it  can seriously obstruct  the advancement  of knowledge.  Significantly,  the best  contributions  to 
social knowledge have been ad hoc studies that disregard method and simply apply common sense. 
But  ad hoc studies suffer a lack of coordination, and the neglect of method makes it difficult to 
evaluate and select findings and results. As a consequence,  ad hoc analyses have little chance of 
stimulating the cumulative growth of knowledge. Science needs method; in its absence, scientific 
thought is not possible and the growth of knowledge is difficult.
  The  human  mind  is  able,  in  principle,  to  understand  all  that  is  the  object  of  experience.  In 
particular, humans should be particularly clever in the understanding of the social world, this being 
a product of human action, its creation. Seen in this light, it is surprising that the understanding and 
management of society on the part of its creator appears so difficult. But the dominant methods, 
together with their potential mistakes, always exert enormous power on the social scientists using 
them; and they may have the power to mislead even those who contest them. In fact, the critique 
deriving from the burgeoning perception of the limits and mistakes of those methods, instead of 
aiding clarification,  has increased confusion, as is typical of times of profound crisis of current 
visions and methods of inquiry. The international scientific conferences on social problems, which 
assemble  skilful  scholars,  are  the  best  representation  of  this  situation.  Conferences  inspired  by 
heterodoxy and aiming to foster pluralism demonstrate  a remarkable inability of participants to 
engage  in  dialogue  with  one  another,  due  to  the  methodological  cages  that  separate  them and 
impede  the  valuation  and  dissemination  of  scholarly  contributions,  while  those  inspired  by 
orthodoxy refuse a platform to dissenting views and persist in building on some crucial mistakes, 
even though these errors have been clearly identified and proved. 
   It seems not exaggerated to say that there is a need to go back to what may be termed the  
Medieval organizational view, that is, the attempt to understand the reason why societies have been 
organized  the  way  that  they  are,  and  hence  to  learn  to  organize  them  more  satisfactorily. 
Significantly, Bertrand Russel wrote: «it is false, from a theoretic point of view, to allow the real 
world inflicting us a model of good and evil»4.
The present study is intended as a contribution that prevents method from becoming a prison for 
the mind as opposed to a stimulant of creativity and knowledge.  In a sense, we are today living a  
condition  opposite  to  that  of  the  Enlightenment.  In  that  era,  a  great  intellectual  revolution 
prognosticated  reforms that  sometimes  proved unrealistic  due to  excessive abstraction  but  that, 
nevertheless, stimulated an intensive social change. Now the contrary is taking place: a deep social 
change  is  at  work  but  is  obstructed  by  the  absence  of  a  methodology  able  to  promote  the 
understanding and the profitable working of its content. 
We shall try to make clear our proposal on method by setting out a multiplicity of applications in 
the main branches of social thought, economics excepted as it has already been treated in another 
book (students interested in economics can read some substantial development of the discussion in 
section 1.4 on positive and normative views, the final section of chapter 2 entitled ‘Economic and 
social planning’and in the section 3.8 entitled ‘Mainstream economics and its opponents’). But we 
have  considered  that  those  applications  are  not  sufficient  and  that,  to  adequately  clarify  our 
methodological proposal, the reasons standing behind it, and to stimulate meditation, a number of 
criticisms of outstanding social  theories and schools of thought were also required. We beg the 
pardon of readers and authors for any misunderstandings that, notwithstanding our severe attempt at 
accuracy, may have occurred in the handling of such extensive and difficult literature. 
4 See B. Russel (1981) Philosophy and science. Newton Compton, Rome, p. 37 
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Naturally, it is difficult to challenge well rooted methodological convictions. Probably, any hopes 
of overcoming the current difficulties  of social  thought  must  be placed on:  a)  that  minority  of 
heterodox scholars aware that the absence of some shared methodological rules makes impossible a 
serious  confrontation  and reciprocal  interaction  among the plurality  of  contributions  and a  real 
challenge  to  mainstream  methodologies;  b)  those  orthodox  scholars  who  start  to  perceive  the 
unreliability of traditional  methodologies when applied to social  science; c) young scholars and 
their tendency to distrust current thought and cultivate a critical attitude, but hopefully found their 
own work on the accurate analysis of facts and errors, not mere polemic; d) the good sense and 
mental openness of educated people, primarily those troubled by a growing dissatisfaction with the 
usual teachings on society; e) and, last but not least, the dimension of the present social crisis and 
the growing perception of the impotence of conventional thinking in understanding and facing it. 
Throughout history,  men’s instincts and special interests have caused untold human and social 
misery,  often justified  by a  utilization  of  reason for  purposes  of  mystification.  The discussion, 
development and results that follow are aimed at combating those mystifications and miseries; the 
results on ethics should be of interest for educational and religious institutions.
   Finally it is to be emphasized that, in light of the innovative content of our proposal on method,  
some initial patience is required of any serious reader; after the half of chapter 2 understanding will 
progress quickly and, with it, enjoyment.
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General introduction and the structure of the book 
1. We are living in the age of science and technology,  but modern humans appear increasingly 
unable to understand what concerns their immediate interests, which is to say, social relations. The 
methodological  confusion  that  obscures  thought  on  social  problems  and  binds  our  hands  will 
probably seem incredible, inexplicable, to future generations and will inspire great regret for the 
immense damage done to humankind. An energetic response to the situation seems indispensable.
Social thought has been imprisoned in a blind alley for a good long time now. Today a profound 
crisis has shaken its very foundations. The doubts and conceptual revisions are often taken for 
signs of cultural vitality, but they actually express a great bewilderment that, sooner or later, must 
bring to fore the necessity for some sounder, more fruitful methodological anchorage, as is already 
the case with the natural and logical-formal sciences. In pursuing such an anchorage, let us provide 
some brief definitions of notions crucial to the analysis on method that will follow:
The word being is intended to express existing reality, while the word doing is intended to express 
the human activity of transformation,  implementation and, in sum, the organization of existing 
reality. For its part, the expression  necessity-constriction indicates unavoidable aspects of reality 
that  are  required  in  the  organization  and  management  of  social  systems  for  reasons  of 
organizational  efficiency;  while  the  expression  choice-possibility-creativeness  refers  to 
possibilities,  in the organization and development  of social  systems,  resulting from choice and 
creative processes. The meaning of the last two expressions will be extensively clarified in section 
3 of chapter 1. 
This book proposes a methodological procedure and rules that: a) weigh the role of observation 
with great caution,  for social  events are very largely non-repetitive and, in particular,  flank the 
observational  standpoint  (being)  to  the  organizational  (doing);  b)  allow  a  precise  distinction 
between necessity-constriction and choice-creativeness,  extending this distinction to the field of 
ethics. We show that the methodological specifications under (a) and (b) are essential prerequisites 
to understanding the generation and organization of societies over time and to surmounting diffuse 
misconceptions  and acute  contrasts  afflicting  social  thought,  such as  the  apparently  irreducible 
contrast between cultural relativism, which is dominant among students of society and sometimes 
goes beyond the question of values, and what may be called ethical absolutism, towards which the 
great  religions  incline.  The methodological  focus  of  the  proposed theoretical  perspective  is  on 
defining some criteria for the selection and classification of postulates for the derivation of general 
principles and basic organizational features, thereby avoiding both the theoretical fragmentation and 
superficiality  of  generic  deductions  and  the  merely  inductive  standpoint  of  dominating 
methodologies.
Unfortunately, the current misconceptions over method prevent correct exposition of the above 
two interrelated issues:  the combination of being and doing, which is the most typical aspect of 
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social phenomena and should be at the heart of any study of ethical values; and the distinction in 
social life and organization between necessity and choice-possibility-creativity, what must and what  
can be done. The first term of this distinction is often wrongly identified with what is durable and 
the second term with what is transient, in spite of the fact that durability and transience concern 
merely observational standpoint; the result is the downgrading the organizational view and element. 
This unclear state of affairs damages the administration of social systems and often results in the 
prevalence,  at  the  expense  of  the  general  interest,  of  the  interests  of  the  most  powerful  and 
influential social groups. If we are to ensure the prevalence of the general interest then it must be 
proclaimed and unanimously recognized as such; and this in turn requires that the general interest 
be seen to rest upon clear scientific foundations. 
A number of tragedies propitiated by prestigious intellectual treatises on social problems – first 
and foremost in the first half of the last century – have not sufficed to direct scholars’ attention to 
the acute need for methodological revision in social thought. Rather, they have instead produced a 
contrary effect: they have reinforced  strictly observation-based method, i.e. centred on being and 
that privileges the spontaneity of processes against the organizational view. 
Some features of our proposal on method are to be traced in current developments. But major, 
common misconceptions are well rooted in current thinking and strongly shielded. We apologize for 
the  strength  of  some  of  our  statement.  We  believe,  however,  that  one’s  tone  in  denouncing 
misconceptions on some vital matters should be proportional to the deafness of the time servers and 
of those who, out of self-interest or cowardice, look the other way. 
Of course, it is senseless to think that method, however well-founded, can immunize us against 
error; it only helps to recognize and reduce it. Every intellectual work suffers limitations and errors, 
which are directly proportional to the dimension of its scope and implications. We hope that other 
minds will evaluate and underline our own errors and the shortcomings of the present contribution; 
it is mainly aimed at opening up some useful avenues of investigation. 
2.  Now we summarize the structure and main contents of the book. 
Chapter 1 develops some criticisms of the most frequently used methods of the social sciences and 
traces some first steps aimed at overcoming their basic drawbacks. Major attention is directed to the 
observation-verification  method,  where  we  distinguish  between: a) strong  observation  method 
(positivism in the strict sense), which is based on the two hypotheses of ‘acceptance of the observed 
reality’ (what has happened had to happen) and its ‘recurrence’; and b) weak observation method, 
which rejects the hypothesis of ‘recurrence’. This second method may be usefully referred to the 
case of minor mutations,  e.g. such as casual and slow biological mutations and those of quasi-
stationary  societies.  But  it  is  inappropriate  when  faced  with  the  accelerating,  endogenous  and 
innovative  motion of dynamic  societies.  A large part  of social  thought  and the most  important 
students of society make use of the weak observation method, which consequently has caused the 
most important and the most rooted misunderstanding in the social sciences. The main cause of the 
inappropriateness for social studies of both the strong and weak observation methods is that they are 
based on being while ignoring doing, while doing constitutes the larger and most typical aspect of 
social reality. 
We then turn to the constructivist view that, by contrast, is centered on  doing but substantially 
ignores  being.  Accordingly,  we insist  on the  need,  in  the social  sciences,  of  a  method able  to 
conjugate being and doing and that, on this basis, seeks to understand becoming. 
The fact that the social sciences mainly concern the organization of social systems implies the 
importance  of  a  transition,  in  social  studies,  from  the  observational  to  the  organizational  
standpoint. This  need  may  be  served  by  a  methodological  reformulation  based  on  the  binary 
contrast of ‘necessity’/‘choice-possibility-creativity’ as developed in chapter 2. The combination of 
being and doing allows us to transcend both abstract rationality, appropriate to the logical-formal 
sciences, and especially naturalistic rationality, in favor of an organizational rationality that rejects 
pure  abstraction.  But  the  organizational  standpoint,  while  strictly  combining  permanence  with 
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change, must be careful not to imply the suppression of the subjective side – that is, the suffocation 
of  individuality  (a  primary  source  of  creativeness)  beneath  hypothetically  all-pervasive  social 
structures and organization. 
Chapter 2 focuses on identifying some procedures and rules for the formulation, in social thought, 
of general principles. It seeks also for the design of some notions concerning the organization and 
development of social systems that are robust in the face of the intensification, in modern societies, 
of innovation and change and that may act as guidelines for social thought and action. The failure of 
the observation-verification method with regard to social reality, primarily due to the growing role 
of innovation and hence non repetitiveness in society, implies that the method of the social sciences 
must  be  deductive.  But  the  importance  (as  just  seen)  to  be  attributed  to  being  indicates  that 
deductions must be based on realistic postulates. The choice of these postulates represents, indeed, 
the real methodological problem (since we are obliged, by the marked non repetitiveness of social 
reality,  to  mistrust  of  observational  verification);  its  solution  requires  the  definition  and 
specification  of  rules  and  classification  procedures  to  guide  scholars  in  the  research and  the  
corroboration of initial postulates so as to move from generic, subjective and merely hypothetical 
deductions  to  an  objective  and  more  penetrating  deductive  approach  that  can  offer  general 
formulations and explanatory principles on a continuously changing reality. So the methodology we 
suggest begins with the classification and selection of postulates and deduces their implications for 
the organization of social systems.  This means that our method embodies a completely different 
notion  of  scientific  rationality  from  that  of  the  natural  sciences.  Both  those  rationalities  are 
scientific in that they are referred to the question of method. But, unlike observational (naturalistic) 
rationality, which is based on the acceptance of existing conditions (with the underlying idea that 
the real is rational)  and which is typical of positivist  and evolutionary social thought, ours is a 
prescriptive and organizational rationality appropriate to a reality that is the work of humanity. We 
do not specifically  expose here the rules and classificatory procedure concerning the choice  of 
postulates but rather set out some applications. 
Some fundamental deductions may be based on postulates concerning important characteristics of 
the  general  conditions  of  development  of  the  period  under  study.  This  allows  to  derive 
organizational features that may be called functional imperatives (but not in Parsons’ sense) in that 
are  required  by  pressing  reasons  of  functional  efficiency  not  linked  to  the  pursuit  of  specific 
(ideological,  technological  and  naturalistic)  objectives,  conditions  and  choices  but  only  to  the 
‘general conditions of development’. These basic organizational features are enduring; that is, they 
change  only when the  general  conditions  of  development  change.  Also  basic  technologies,  i.e. 
technologies that are fundamental in characterizing the general conditions of development, and the 
organizational forms that they imply, are functional imperatives. 
Some institutional and organizational features may be imposed by the conditions of nature. They 
are local and were decisive in characterizing the societies of the past.  Their influence has been 
strongly  reduced  by  technological  development,  mainly  through  the  increasing  speed  of 
communications and the role of artifacts. 
 The implications  of the conditions of nature and the functional  imperatives give the field of  
‘necessity’ in the organization and functioning of social system.
 An important generalization is expressed by the notion of ontological imperatives. These are the 
result of very general and fundamental aspects of human nature, and so their operation is essential 
to the unfolding of human evolutionary potentialities.  Ontological  imperatives are,  for instance, 
constituted by the tolerance principle and other conditions able to stimulate creativity.  As such, 
these imperatives are universally valid, in all historical eras and mainly concern important ethical 
values. But unlike functional imperatives, they are  not imposed and required (for organizational 
efficiency) by the general conditions of development and their motion. As a consequence, they may 
be repressed even for very long periods of time by the existence of a civilization that opposes them.  
They will  certainly triumph only if,  in the course of development,  they also become functional 
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imperatives. The suffocation of ontological imperatives prevents social development, that is, the 
change  of  the  general  conditions  of  development  and  hence  the  advent  of  new  functional 
imperatives. With the establishment of modern dynamic society,  various ontological imperatives 
have become functional  imperatives;  that  is,  they must  be satisfied if  this  kind of society is to 
survive; they have thus become a ‘necessity’. Among the other things, the notions of functional and 
ontological  imperatives  also  offer  clarifications  on  the  concept  of  utopia  and  its  possible 
relationship with scientific procedure. 
 Moving from the general to the particular, i.e. to classification concerning choice and innovation, 
an important notion is that of civilizations. This is intended as an institutional set of ideological and 
technological choices with the consequent organizational forms, and marked by basic ideological 
choices  (grand  options)  around  which  the  society  is  structured  and  integrated.  The  forms  of 
civilization, even if basically express choice, are distinguished by the pervasiveness of their effects 
on social systems and by their great duration. This illustrates the conceptual difference between 
necessity  and duration:  necessity  is  the  opposite  of  choice,  but  the choices  that  embody grand 
options, at the base of civilizations, imply long duration. Next we consider the particular aspects of 
societies (innovations and single choices), as well as the role they should play in the building of the 
social science. 
Social science should begin with the definition of functional and ontological imperatives and the 
identification of civilizations; accordingly,  it  should go deeply into the roles and interactions of 
these explanatory categories. Then the more specific aspects, i.e. specific choices and innovations, 
should be added, with their implications for the organization of social systems. Thus a combination 
of  innovative  flair  and  rational  drive,  innovation  and  structural  organization,  is  specified,  the 
relationship between the two aspects being crucial to understanding social and historic processes, 
as chapter 4 shows.
The method proposed here implies the scientific derivation of many important ethical values that 
denies the dominant idea of relativism in all values. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the criticism of the startling array of methods used by social thinkers that 
represent various different attempts to grasp some important, peculiar aspects of social reality: the 
unpredictability of events (mainly due to innovation), choice, value judgments, radical uncertainty, 
evolutionary creative movement, learning processes, unintentional events and constructive action. 
We show that the great variety of methods, far from representing fecund and creative pluralism as 
many scholars would have it, are for the most an expression of a widespread bewilderment that 
obstructs the advancement of social science. 
  Chapter  4  delineates,  using the methodological  categories  set  out  in  Chapter  2,  a  theoretical 
framework for the explanation of social and historical development that will then be compared with 
a multiplicity of existing theories on this subject.
   The foundations for our theory of social and historical process are the interrelationships among 
the  notions  of  ontological  imperative,  functional  imperative  and civilization:  depending on the 
manner  in which it  embodies  ontological  imperatives,  the  form of civilization either  hastens or 
blocks creativeness and the related variation in the general conditions of development¸  and hence 
the advent of new and more advanced functional imperatives that cause, willy-nilly, the advent of 
new civilizations consistent with them. 
 More  particularly,  the  causal  picture  (and  interpretative  chain)  of  the  social  and  historical 
processes  suggested  by  our  methodological  construction  and  categories  can  be  summarized  as 
follows: 
A creative drive lies at the beginning of every developmental  process. The way in which the 
resulting civilization satisfies (or denies) ontological imperatives (and hence creativity) determines 
the intensity of innovation, evolutionary motion and development. The consequent possible change 
in the general conditions of development generates new functional imperatives demanded by the 
new general  conditions  of  development  for  cogent  reasons  of  organizational  efficiency.  If  one 
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imperative is in contradiction with the existing form of civilization, this form will inevitably be 
transformed  into  another  that  is  consistent  with  the  new  functional  imperatives.  And  so  forth 
through the subsequent surges of innovation. 
It is important to note that the pace of the development process depends chiefly on a civilization’s  
accordance  with  ontological  imperatives.  If  a  civilization  is  adverse  to  (and  hence  suffocates) 
important  ontological imperatives,  i.e.  suffocates the expression of the evolutionary potential  of 
individuals and peoples, innovation and hence evolutionary motion will be obstructed, condemning 
the  social  process  to  a  flat  or  parabolic  course  (stagnation  and  decadence).  Stagnation  or 
disintegration are powerfully spurred by an ‘excess’ of, respectively, rational drive or creative flair, 
and  vice  versa.  Otherwise,  a  lengthening  cyclical  trend  is  fueled  by  the  alternation  between 
innovation and the consequent structural reorganization; the length of the cycle  depends on the 
degree  of  coordination  between  innovation  and  structural  organization.  Thus  the  degree  of 
satisfaction  of  ontological  imperatives  and the  relation  between innovative  drive  and structural 
organization give rise to a sine, parabolic or flat development curve. 
Our  interpretation  and  its  analytical  tools  allow a  rigorous  distinction  of  social  process  into 
historical  ages.  The notion  of  historical  era,  to  be unambiguous,  needs  to  be  based  on factors 
belonging to the realm of ‘necessity’ (such as functional imperatives), not the realm of ‘choice’ – 
even such crucial choices as those between civilizations. In short, historical ages are singled out by 
the character of the functional imperatives as demanded by the general conditions of development. 
That the aspect of ‘necessity’  is flanked, in our theory,  by that of ‘choice-possibility-creativity’ 
shows that the historical process is not deterministic. And the world appears – both from a scientific 
and  a  practical  point  of  view –  in  its  true  characteristics:  a  never-ending  ‘correction  process’, 
resulting  from the  limitations  of  human  nature  and mind;  a  process  that  may  ultimately  bring 
humanity, not to the achievement of some earthly paradise (a senseless expectation indeed), but to 
the  realization  of  the  best  of  their  potentialities  –  intellectually,  ethically  and  operationally.  
Unfortunately,  historical  processes  have  not  uncommonly  involved  devastating  events  and 
deviations from ontological and functional imperatives that have prevented the potential advance 
along that evolutionary path. 
Chapter 5 offers, in the light of our interpretative framework, a critical review of some of the main 
theories of social and historical processes, ending up with Eliade’s ‘terror of history’ and historical 
monstrosities. The reference to our methodological categories in the building and administration of 
human societies shows that it is the lack of a scientific basis of social thought that has allowed these 
horrors to have been perpetrated throughout history.
Part II explores some applications in various branches of the social sciences of the methodological 
proposal developed in Part I.
Chapter 6 concerns anthropology, which refers to the first stage of the human adventure and to very 
simple  societies,  albeit  with  a  variety  of  cultures;  such  variety  highlights  the  importance  of 
civilization in investigating social processes and its crucial role in stimulating or, more frequently, 
obstructing further development. A number of functional imperatives typical of primitive ages are 
considered that allow us to bring to light and to better understand some basic common features of 
primitive  societies,  notwithstanding  their  extreme  variety.  In  particular,  we comment  upon  the 
nature and the meaning of the ‘power of society’, which, with its various and sometimes eccentric 
features, is probably the most important and involved characteristic of primitive civilizations. We 
underline the strong opposition of the power of society to evolutionary process and take note that 
the  oppressive  character  of  such  a  power  is  frequently  misunderstood  by anthropologists  who 
eulogize  a  mythical  freedom  of  primitives  from  domination.  Finally,  the  chapter  sketches  the 
transition from the power of society to ‘command-power’ and ‘state-power’.
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Chapter 7 is mainly concerned with politics. Political action – the exercise of power – is particularly 
subject to abuse and mystification. We analyze the problem of sovereignty and its legitimization, 
starting  with  the  contributions  of  Benjamin  Constant,  Jean  J.  Rousseau,  Gaetano  Mosca,  Karl 
Schmitt, and Hans Kelsen to show that, without a strict distinction between ‘necessity’ and ‘choice-
possibility’  in  the  organization  of  social  systems,  the  theoretical  legitimization  of  power  is 
impossible. The remedy offered by democracy is partial, and the separation of powers may simply 
produce (as it has often done) a division of the power to abuse. The notions of power of domination 
and functional (or service) power are sketched out, and we show that a science of the organization 
of social systems, built mainly upon the analytical categories disclosed in Chapter 2, provides a 
powerful antidote to the degeneration of power by providing a scientific solution to the problem of 
how to control controllers.
The binary ‘freedom-responsibility’ and the relations between the two and with the problem of 
power are then investigated. We note that ‘responsibility’ goes beyond individual action and point 
out  that  the  definition  of  a  system  of  responsibilities  requires  the  notions  of  functional  and 
ontological imperatives, necessity and choice-possibility. The philosophical and theological aspects 
of this question and theodicy are examined.
We then emphasize  that  the observational  method is  anti-reformist,  in  that  the acceptance  of 
existing conditions (the real is rational, the real is necessary) is inherently conservative. We also 
consider the hyper-relativist  prejudice that any and all  ethical  choices and reform proposals are 
acceptable in principle. It appears that the primary cause of these attitudes and prejudices is the lack 
of  a  clear  distinction  between  ‘necessity’  and  ‘choice-possibility’.  Afterwards,  the  problem of 
inequalities versus social justice and its far-reaching implications are deepened. The last section 
provides a wide-ranging illustration of the meaning of political action in the light of a number of 
major historical events and lost opportunities.
Chapter 8 begins by underlining that law is mainly concerned with doing, even if it cannot disregard 
being. We show that if we are to justify normative action, explain its foundations and detach the 
command power (as far as possible) from free will, the connection of being with doing and the 
organizational  view,  together  with  our  methodological  categories,  are  indispensable.  Using our 
distinction between ‘choice-possibility’ and ‘necessity’ and the objective character of some ethical 
values, we set out a critique of the following: natural law doctrine, positive law, the sociology of 
law. 
In particular, considerable space is given over to the opposition between natural and positive law, 
the contents and roots of such opposition and related errors concerning command-power. Then we 
discuss the ambiguities of the Enlightenment and contractualist view, specifically the idea of the 
social contract, the one-sidedness of which left an opening for the historicist reaction. 
The perplexities of some contemporary authors on the foundations and the role of law in dynamic 
societies are considered and criticized. Finally, we set out a theory of juridical objectivism derived 
from our methodological categories, laying down some analytical foundations for the explanation 
and the construction of legal order.
Chapter  9  is  mainly  dedicated  to  sociological  cognitive  method,  one  of  the  most  important 
methodological  approaches  in  sociology.  The individual  is  the  backbone of  cognitivism,  which 
almost totally neglects social aspects and structures. In effect, the role of the individual is one of our 
ontological imperatives; but Weber and Boudon ascribe excessive importance to the individual. The 
assertion at the center of Boudon’s theory of social evolution, namely that individualism advances 
incessantly across history, is questionable in the extreme, as we can see from the constant presence 
across history of so-called ‘closed’ societies alongside open ones. 
Weber’s  meditations  on  method  are  variegated  and  also  include  an  anticipation  of  Popper’s 
falsification method in setting out the methodological  sequence: choice of initial  point of view, 
elimination of the explanatory factor posited, comparison of the resulting hypothetical process with 
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reality in order to verify the causal role of that factor. However, this is just an incidental episode in 
Weber’s treatise on method. He does not follow up in order to develop the strong observational 
features  that  it  suggests.   Here  we  limit  ourselves  to  noting  that  one  of  cognitivism’s  most 
ambiguous aspects lies in its notion of rationality.  Weber’s analyses and interpretations insist on 
rationality,  but  one  crucial  aspect  of  his  sociology,  i.e.  ethical  relativism,  neglects  rationality 
entirely and thereby arrives upon the ambiguous and misleading notion of double ethics.
Boudon, by contrast,  insists on the objective character of values, deriving objectivity from the 
Weberian idea of ‘diffuse rationality’  that states that in the long run societies converge towards 
rational solutions and organizations by trial and error. Like dialectical idealism, this convergence, 
which is a pillar of Boudon’s theory of social evolution, implies that the real is both rational and 
necessary (inevitable), even if in Boudon’s exposition this spontaneist point of arrival has a liberal  
flavour. But the Weberian ‘diffuse rationality’ (a merely observational idea) operates in the very 
long run at best. It ignores the main problem of social thought, i.e. how to avoiding the sometimes 
horrifying  historical  disasters  that  have  marked  the  spontaneous,  extremely  slow and laborious 
convergence towards the rational. 
The tenth and last chapter discusses ethical values and their connections with religious thought. In 
particular, we underscore four principles (deriving primarily from the Christian message) that have 
powerfully stimulated the evolution of society. The historical events that have followed from those 
dynamic  seeds  are  briefly  recounted,  and  their  successes  and failures  in  defeating  the  circular 
motion  and  vision  proper  to  stationary  societies  in  favour  of  the  linear-progressive  vision  of 
historical process are set out.
Next, and by way of a comparison between stationary and dynamic societies, the relativist and 
absolutist  views  are  analysed  and  some  equivocations  on  values,  as  characterizing  social  and 
religious  thinking  respectively,  are  discussed  on  the  basis  of  what  we  have  called  cultural  
objectivism. The roots of civilizations (which feed opposition between peoples) are considered in 
historical perspective; their vitality and ability or inability to adapt to evolutionary motion weighed 
and the usefulness of  cultural objectivism,  (that is, the objective definition of fundamental ethical 
values) to this type of inquiry is emphasized.
Finally,  we treat  some current  misunderstandings  regarding the problem of  a  global  ethics  – 
crucial in this age of globalization – illustrating them with examples that bring out the substantial 
nature of  cultural objectivism. Some aspects of Christian social thought and its mix of faith and 
reason are discussed, and the positions on values of some philosophers and students of society of 
modern and contemporary ages are criticized.
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PART I (Theory)
1 Preliminary considerations on the method of social thought
Introduction
This chapter is a sort of provocative introduction to the methodological questions developed in Part 
I of the book.
   Man is obliged, by the limits of his cognitive skills, to proceed by trial and error, especially if he 
operates creatively or is forced to cope with non-repetitive situations. Moreover, he is obliged to 
learn by mistakes; and to be able so to learn he must suffer the tribulations and adversity caused by 
his mistakes and so be prompted to act with mental flexibility. This structural dependency of human 
learning and improvement on the adversities caused by mistakes can make the world resemble a 
sort of enormous reformatory, whatever one’s religious feeling and belief may be.
Human beings are,  however,  endowed with reason,  the intense and appropriate  use of  which 
enables men to ease the cost of their evolutionary mission and significantly reduce the suffering 
inflicted by mistakes and the learning process. But in their social relations men insist on wasting or 
stifling  their  cognitive  skills.  This  can be clearly seen if  we consider  one of  the most  striking 
shortcomings  of  civilization:  the  extreme modesty  of  ethical  improvement,  notwithstanding  the 
rapid increase of technical capacities and knowledge. From the dawn of history men have listened 
to and approved the exhortations of important religions to strive for moral purpose, goodness and 
brotherhood; they have admired and exalted the sacrifices of martyrs and heroes inspired by such 
sentiments;  but  in  practical  life,  they  have  largely  ignored  all  of  this.  This  shows that  ethical  
exhortations as such are not persuasive, that they are obscured by personal interests. To be effective, 
such exhortations must be preceded by scientific teachings that reinforce them and prevent the use 
of reason to perpetrate and justify abuse and vice. We accordingly address our analysis to what 
seems to us to be more solid  and engaging ground, namely the way that  human knowledge is 
formed. We shall see that this line of inquiry leads to a scientific clarification of some important 
questions  on ethics (ethical  objectivism):  a clarification that  may improve moral  behaviour  and 
allow religions to carry out their work much more wisely and incisively than is permitted today by 
the common declaration by science of impotence on moral matters – a declared value neutrality that 
fosters nihilism. 
The major impulse to human knowledge is born from the ability of human minds to co-operate, to 
select and hence to accumulate discoveries. Let us insist in saying that such ability requires the 
definition  of some general  methodological  rules that  do not imprison human creativity  in  rigid 
procedures but nevertheless make possible both dialogue and co-operation among scholars as well 
as  the  recognition  of  real  contributions  to  the  advancement  of  knowledge.  Such recognition  is 
necessary in order to allow research to benefit, in the course of time, from higher and higher starting 
points. The human ability to favour the cumulative growth of knowledge is the single factor that, 
over the millennia, has dug the abyss that separates the human condition from that of other animal  
species, which have consequently been crushed by the hegemony of humanity. The discovery of 
fire,  the  invention  of  the  wheel,  of  writing,  of  various  agricultural  techniques  and  metal 
manufacturing, the birth of urban centres and of an intellectual class of professional thinkers, the 
discovery  of  efficient  forms  of  government  and  of  law,  have  been  the  great  achievements  of 
civilization over all of human pre-history and history, permitting the construction of our lengthy 
sequence of social orders. 
The  acceleration  of  technological  and scientific  discoveries,  and hence  of  the  pace  of  social 
change, by the side of which humanity has failed to achieve a parallel acceleration of social science, 
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has caused a “short circuit of knowledge”. It is a widespread opinion today that this was inevitable, 
as the problems of rapidly changing societies are held to be harder to understand than the natural 
world. We shall see that this opinion is erroneous and that the stagnation of social knowledge is  
rather the effect of methodological misconceptions and misunderstandings.
This  cognitive  short  circuit  multiplies  errors,  misunderstandings  and  difficulties  in  the 
government of human societies as this is certainly affected by the state of social knowledge, and 
causes  discredit  even  to  the  most  prestigious  branches  of  scientific  knowledge  by  favouring 
senseless uses of technology.  To overcome this inequality of knowledge what is required is for 
social thought to discover a method of inquiry that is not inferior to that of the natural and formal-
logical sciences. Unfortunately, the tendency is to react to difficulties with exhortation rather than 
rigorous scientific research, as it is far easier to speak to the heart than to the mind; but this mode of 
conduct is ephemeral. It is wise to prefer to meet difficulties than to indulge in ephemeral thinking, 
and I hope that readers will be induced to appreciate this choice by the conclusions to which it will 
eventually lead.
1.1   Great ‘errors’ fuelled by methodological misconceptions 
Both natural world and human societies gravitate, in the long run, toward functional coherence and 
efficiency – toward organizational rationality. This gravitation toward rationality is indispensable to 
their survival and evolution. A reality differently acting would tend to self-destruction and perhaps 
would never have emerged from the primordial chaos.
But the great difference between the evolution of human societies and the evolution of the natural 
world must  be emphasized.  Natural evolution proceeds so slowly that spontaneous evolutionary 
motion  and  selection  processes  can  develop  without  substantial  discontinuities.  Humanity,  by 
contrast, having lived for a long time in almost immutable primitive societies in which we little 
differed from other species of animals began to advance many centuries ago: at first with faltering 
steps, then with a slow and uncertain pace, and finally, much later, with a progressively accelerating 
pace that has often times been set by the temerity and success of individual pioneers.
This acceleration of the pace of evolution entails that the spontaneous gravitation toward efficient 
and rational organizational forms and social relations has become increasingly beset by wandering 
and even retrograde movements. We have seen that such difficulties are in part inevitable, arising 
from  limitations  of  human  knowledge  that  oblige  even  research  activities  endowed  with  very 
sophisticated means and procedures to learn by trial  and error. It  is  impossible  to eliminate  all  
errors, but it is judicious to attempt to reduce their dimensions to the minimum set by the levels of 
human cognitive skills; not the levels of individuals, which may be very poor indeed, but rather 
those levels embodied in the social scientific organization of knowledge by way of the cooperation 
of many minds.
What is particularly impressive in the study of social processes are both the numbers and the 
magnitude of the “errors” that have troubled the cycles and rhythms of human societies and led 
them to trample underfoot ethical values and institutions that have subsequently proved to be of 
fundamental importance for human evolution.  Many examples might be cited,  but we will limit 
ourselves here to the discussion of one extremely instructive illustration from the recent past.
In the historical period immediately preceding our own, billions of people believed it not only 
possible but also imperative that a more just and efficient society be organized, one more able to 
develop than the capitalist systems of the West. This was a laudable intention indeed, and appears 
today even more urgent than it did yesterday. In the name of such a project, multitudes of dissenters 
and innocent  persons  suffered incredible  repression,  while  countless  others  worked hard for its 
realization. The worst of it is that the promised new society inflicted pains by no means inferior  
than  those  demanded  by  the  transition  toward  it.  Renowned  social  commentators  and 
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revolutionaries had declared that the building of the new world required the suppression of the 
entrepreneurial function and the market, considered the major causes of exploitation, immoralities 
and alienation.  But their  suppression propelled  the birth  of a bureaucratic-centralized,  grey and 
oppressive order. In the end, these systems of “real socialism” collapsed. They represented a dead-
end,  an  organizational  form  that  trampled  on  some  fundamental  values,  suffocated  creativity, 
engendered a profound alienation and was unable to develop and compete with rival Western social 
systems. Humanity pretended to open the door to a more advanced historical phase and, according 
to the opinion of the most enthusiast ‘believers’, was actually in the very process of stepping out of 
this door and into a paradise on earth, simply by re-establishing bureaucratic forms and forms of 
social  obedience  reminiscent  of  the  quasi-stationary  ancient  world.  These  organizational  forms 
allowed for acute and wise government of the most advanced societies of ancient time, but they are 
unable to cope with social change. In this way a tragedy of immense proportions was prepared in 
the name of stepping onto the road toward a bright and glorious new dawn.
A major cause of this failure was disregard for one elementary fact: social change requires agents 
and institutions  that,  out  of  a  sense of  duty or  for  personal  advantage,  are  able  or  inclined  to 
stimulate change and to face the consequent uncertainty. We shall see that cumulative change needs 
a decentralized order and hence the market, not a bureaucratic class that requires nearly perfect 
knowledge  and  that,  consequently,  detests  innovation  and  clings  rather  to  a  merely  repetitive 
stationary motion.  In brief,  one crucial  error was a disregard for the fact that  modern dynamic 
societies are permeated by radical uncertainty.
A new challenge has now arisen with the rebellions against the autocrats of Arab societies. One 
fear  is  that  these  rebellions  will  facilitate  a  transition  from  autocracy  to  fundamentalism  and 
theocracy (just as happened in Iran); a movement, that is, toward a regime even more oppressive 
and inclined to immobility than the autocratic one, which will require decades to escape and which 
will be even less appropriate for modern dynamic societies than was real socialism. Another fear is 
that the result of rebellion will be merely confusion, or perhaps a reproduction of the worst aspects 
of Western societies. 
The experience of such great errors does not immunize modern dynamic societies from the danger 
of making even greater ones; at least, not unless social thought provides humanity with the requisite 
knowledge. If we do not specify its methodological roots, the error that has impeded our vision of  
the  dead-end  of  bureaucratic  real  socialism  is  incomprehensible,  thus  making  useless  that 
experience. These methodological roots consist in a disregard for what we shall see to be a main 
point of the method of social thought: attention to the general and basic characters of the considered 
reality and to the current general conditions of development with their institutional requirements 
and imperatives.
Methodological equivocations have an extraordinary ability to suffocate the acuteness of scholars 
and wise men, who are accustomed to systematic reasoning. An excellent illustration, in line with 
our considerations above, is the important misunderstandings about the entrepreneur found in the 
writings of the most famous of writers on the notion of entrepreneurship, Joseph A. Schumpeter, 
who forecasted the collapse of capitalism as a consequence of the advancement of the process of 
bureaucratization. Some decades later, John K. Galbraith forecasted the convergence of capitalism 
and socialism by way of the bureaucratization typical  of big business.  Well,  if these two great 
economists, sociologists and students of historical processes did not see the bureaucratic dead-end 
in the 1940s and 1960s, what chance had Lenin and the Bolsheviks to see such a dead-end at the 
beginning of the century? This occlusion points to something very misleading in the analyses of 
students  of  society;  and  this  misleading  factor  lies  in  the  problem  of  method,  the  strongest 
intellectual tool conditioning the activities and thinking of scientists.5 
5 Some students (in particular, von Mises and Hayek) did indeed declare the inability of real socialism to govern society 
and  attributed  that  inability  mainly  to  the  elimination  of  prices  and  the  entrepreneurial  function;  a  conviction  
subsequently confirmed by Popper. But it was not a widely shared conviction and was often derided by social scientists. 
It lacked persuasiveness because not founded on a solid and shared methodological base.
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A review of the vicissitudes of real socialism makes immediately evident a simple and crucial 
issue. Some basic organizational and ethical-ideological aspects of societies are forced, with the 
advancement of the general conditions (and phases) of development, not only to change, but also to 
assume some general features (as witnessed, for instance, by the transition from the crucial role of 
kinship in primitive societies to bureaucracy in ancient empires and the market in the modern age). 
It  is  important  to  be  aware  of  the  differing  institutional,  ethical-ideological  and organizational 
pillars upon which human societies rest in the various historical ages. One main purpose of this 
book is to show that such knowledge is indispensable for understanding historical processes and 
properly governing social process. Nevertheless, these institutional requisites continue to be often 
disregarded. For instance, we can see that the transition process of the current period from real 
socialism toward the market often privileges the worst (and by no means indispensable) elements of 
capitalism, not to mention a number of absurdities absent in the history of Western capitalism, 
while it disregards or undervalues some organizational aspects that actually represent the true force 
of capitalism.
It is very rare, in the course of history,  to see an omnipotent and strongly-armed ruling class 
almost submissively cede power. In its last days of despair, the bureaucracy of real socialism could 
easily have initiated a nuclear war and, as a result,  the stagnation of the real socialist countries 
would have been followed by a tremendous regression on a world-wide scale. By chance and good 
fortune, however, the process of decay had been sufficiently prolonged that an invertebrate and 
confused ruling class had come into being.6 It was the wearing down of this socialist ruling class 
that saved the world; after some decades of tribulations, the apple fell by itself.   
The power systems of every society, even if senseless, always try to preserve themselves and hide 
their deficiencies; and this can lengthen significantly the time demanded for the transition to a more 
appropriate  and  rational  social  order.  Only  scientific  knowledge  can  clearly  make  evident  the 
mistakes and, in this way, accelerate the transition. Otherwise the spontaneous convergence toward 
a  more  efficient  and  appropriate  organization  may  require  a  very  long  time  and  face  serious 
difficulties. 
It  is surprising that social  theory has not yet  achieved a method consonant with the reality it 
investigates,  notwithstanding  the  clear  unsuitableness  of  the  current  methodologies.  But  the 
problem is that the dominant cultural climate strongly opposes convergence on a general method in 
social inquiry. This opposition is fuelled by the epistemological critique of science that dominated 
the scene in the second half of the last century and that even today shows great vigour. Such a 
critique  originated  ‘cultural  relativism’,  that  is,  the  assumption  of  non-comparability  between 
different  explanatory models,  and hence an idea of science  as  an almost  untrammelled  way of 
reasoning. The result is that a multitude of methodological proposals have issued forth, multiplying 
the confusion. 
The formal-logical and natural sciences have general procedures and rules that are shared by the 
community of scholars; this guarantees commensurability and comparability of contributions, hence 
the  cumulative  growth  of  knowledge,  notwithstanding  the  cavils  of  cognitive  relativists  and 
epistemology. But modern social thought is not only afflicted by the lack of codified procedures and 
methodological rules appropriate to social reality and shared by the academic community; it is also 
the victim of a paralysing doctrine of incommensurability. This has fragmented social studies into 
countless schools of thought, each with its own method and hence unable to interact.  This means  
that  social  scientists  have  essentially  repudiated  one  of  the  greatest  intellectual  discoveries  of  
mankind: shared methodology that allows the cumulative growth of knowledge. This repudiation 
expresses a real failure of human thought. Therefore, a main problem of our time is constituted by 
our extensive equivocations on the method of social thought.
6 The almost grotesquely reactionary coup d’état attempted in Russia in 1991 demonstrated the total ineptness of the old 
Soviet bureaucracy. 
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1.2   Excursus on the methodological peculiarity and equivocations of the social sciences
1.   Many  important  methodological  problems  are  very  general  in  nature,  such  as  the  role  of 
induction, deduction, analogy, the question of open and closed systems, the relation between the 
logic of discovery and the logic of explanation, the line that divides science from non-science. The 
scholars who treat these very general aspects insist on the uniqueness of method. But this insistence 
seems inappropriate, in that in addition to these very general questions there is the need for some 
important  discussion concerning the character of the very general classes of the problems dealt 
with.
In  this  regard,  a  three-way  partition  becomes  crucial  as  a  decisive  determinant  of  the 
characteristics of methodological rules and procedure for large classes of problems, to the point that 
failure to consider such partition turns method into a hindrance as opposed to a help to research. 
The three-way partition refers to some major lines of scientific endeavour: one based on abstraction 
and logical consistency, the other two centred on natural and on social reality respectively.
The method of the formal-logical sciences uses the criterion of ‘abstract rationality’;  that is, it 
adopts postulates that abstract from reality and then rigorously derives implications from them. The 
abstractions from reality allow the formulation of very general principles, embracing even situations 
and cases that at the moment are completely ignored. These formulations may sometimes seem 
nothing but pure logical jokes; but due precisely to their abstractness they may provide unexpected 
services to scientific investigation.7
But the formal-logical procedure is completely inappropriate for natural and social studies, which 
must  pay great  attention  to  the  nature  of  the  reality  investigated;  in  fact,  the  serious  mistakes 
discussed in Section 1 were primarily due to the absence of realism. Economic theory,  with its  
sometimes exaggerated pretensions to mathematical rigour, is the branch of social thought that has 
most  abused abstract  rationality,  an  abuse  that  has  occurred  mainly  in  the  theories  of  general 
economic equilibrium that ignore uncertainty, entrepreneurship and endogenous innovation. 
Of course, every theory of society or nature needs abstraction, but from this need must not follow 
unrealistic  basic  assumptions.  An  inquiry  on  method  of  both  natural  and  social  sciences  may 
conveniently start from two opposite hypotheses concerning the reality investigated:
a) Reality remains unvaried over time or is subject only to stationary-repetitive changes.
b) Reality is subject to innovations, i.e. to a substantial and persistent evolutionary dynamics.
In the first hypothesis time is reversible; it is possible to go backwards and forwards, and it is a 
matter  of  indifference  which  temporal  direction  is  taken (i.e.  the  plus  sign in  front  of  t  may be 
substituted by a minus sign); in a word, there is not history. In the second hypothesis, time includes 
singular and irrevocable events; therefore time is irreversible and there is history.
An efficacious  tool for the study of reality under (a) is represented by the method that can be 
denominated mechanistic observationism, and which is based on statistical inference and experiments 
and  on  the  formalization,  through  suitable  differential  or  difference  equations,  of  subsequently 
discovered uniformities. This method has yielded great achievements in astronomy and physics. But its 
application to reality under (b) must be considered with great circumspection and critical sense.
In order to consider this subject more deeply, we refer to a generalization of the above method that 
purifies  it  of  any reference  to  particular  techniques  of  theoretical  formulation.  It  consists  in  the 
methodological procedure that can be synthesized through the following succession of three stages: 
Initial Observations - Formulation of Theoretical Hypotheses - New Control Observations directed to 
verify the specified theory. We shall indicate this procedure, with which the scientific method is often 
identified, with the notation O-H-Oc, i.e. Observation-Hypothesis-counter Observation. This procedure 
is not immune to indeterminateness and inconsistencies that concern both the terms H and O, as has 
been clearly established by the epistemological debate.8 
7 Significant  examples  are Boolean algebra and non-Euclidean geometries  that,  long after  their  initial  formulation, 
proved to be highly valuable in, respectively, information theory and the explorations of sidereal space.
8 See M. Pera (1982). But some scholars (e.g. Popper) deny the necessity of the first term O of the procedure.
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It is immediately evident that, in general, reality is not repetitive but evolutionary, i.e. it must be 
classified as falling under (b). This nature of reality is due to innovations and also to the influence of 
history on subsequent behavior (hysteresis);  and this is the case even when the slow workings of 
evolution  do  not  always  permit  the  observation  of  mutations  even  in  various  offspring.9 The 
indeterminacy of phenomena that results from such behaviours undermines the major aspiration of the 
O-H-Oc procedure, i.e. it undermines the attempt to discover laws of motion, which permit quantitative 
forecasting on every time interval, given the initial conditions and the parameters expressing such laws. 
This is particularly so in the presence of chaotic areas. Nevertheless, we must recognize that the O-H-
Oc procedure has proved itself a powerful tool in the quest to understand the natural world. This is the 
result of the fact that the natural world approaches the situation described under (a). It is precisely the 
substantial invariableness of natural reality over long intervals of time that makes acceptable the terms 
O of the procedure O-H-Oc. For its part, the term H, which concerns the formulation of theoretical 
hypotheses,  derives its operational efficiency from the fact that the principle of rationality,  i.e.  of 
coherence, on which it is based, has an absolutely general analytical fertility, as reality always inclines 
to organize itself on the basis of the principle of rationality and functional efficiency: as we noted at the 
beginning of section 1, the struggle for existence gives an impetus toward natural order; that is,  it  
imposes the principle of rationality and organizational efficiency, which we can always perceive in the  
shape of the surrounding world; in brief, it provides an impetus toward the identity real=rational . 
Consequently,  we are able to represent reality through the principles of logic and the criterion of 
organizational efficiency and coherence (as the term H implies).10 
Let us provide a clarifying example. To prepare the ground for the development of our ideas on 
the method of social sciences that will follow we shall refer here to biology, which represents the 
natural reality in which innovation and hysteresis are most frequent. Suppose that we are interested 
in  the  explanation  of  the  functioning  of  the  ecological  system,  hence  in  the  formalization  of 
relations among species. It is immediately evident that such relations may assume a competitive, 
cooperative or predatory character. They may be represented, then, through a dynamic system of 
predatory,  cooperative or competitive equations, well known in the mathematical applications to 
biology. The invariance over very long time intervals of the relationships among species allows for 
the estimation of such a model (as well as other formalization concerning molecular and organic 
biology);  the model  can  then  be  utilized  to  find  equilibrium solutions  and to  perform stability 
analysis, forecasts and simulations. Of course, the perfect stationary cycle of movement, typical of 
the planets, is not reflected in the biological world, where it is precluded by accidental mutations, 
representing the main actor in the evolution of species. But such mutations are very slow and can be 
taken  exogenously  by  the  model  so  as  to  analyze  the  way they interact  with  the  surrounding 
environment  and  eventually  are  selected.  So,  a  representation  of  the  evolutionary  movement, 
specifically the Darwinian mechanism of selection and differentiation of species, will be provided.
As we can see, the usefulness of the procedure O-H-Oc in the example just discussed (with H 
expressing competitive, cooperative or predation hypotheses), both for explanatory and forecasting 
purposes,  is  mainly  due  to  the  small  number  of  accidental  mutations  and the  slowness  of  the 
evolutionary process during time, which imply little violation of the postulate of the invariability of 
the observed reality.
 2.    Now let us turn to the consideration of the difficulties faced by the observational procedure and 
the principle of rationality, i.e. the method O-H-Oc, when applied to social reality. If one adopted the 
hypothesis  that  human  activity,  like  that  of  bees  and  termites,  is  carried  out  in  quintessentially 
9 One may conjecture that the Whole always remains identical in its immortality; but such a statement has not a scientific  
character, as it is unverifiable. Reality is always evolutionary.
10 I. Lakatos emphasizes this aspect by saying: «If science aims at the truth, it must aim at coherence; if it renounces to 
coherence,  it  renounces  to  the  truth» See  I.  Lakatos,  ‘Falsification and the  method of  the  programs of  scientific  
research’, In: Criticism and growth of knowledge, edited by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1984, p.  
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repetitive forms, the effort to understand its patterns and implications certainly could (and indeed, 
should) be centred on the method of observation and empirical verification, just as is the case with the 
natural sciences. But the fact is that individual ends, value choices and judgments, and technological 
knowledge may continuously and unpredictably change. Man is distinguished by his adaptability and, 
even more, by his great capacity for innovation. There is no question of denying that the state of nature 
has a strong influence on human activities. Nevertheless, in the conduct of such activities innovation 
unquestionably plays an extremely important and, we may say, a decisive role, not only qualitatively 
but also in strictly quantitative terms, as everything that humankind has accomplished since its first 
appearance on the Earth is substantially the fruit of innovation (deliberate or unplanned) 11. 
The basic characteristic of innovations is that they are the product of human creativity, and as such 
are by definition unpredictable and can arrive in any number of unexpected guises and forms. The 
succession of innovations gives rise to the phenomenon of social change. That, in a word, is the great 
difference between society and nature:  social change, which assumes dimensions much larger than 
change generated by the mutations in the natural world.
Social reality is a slippery, mobile, undulating terrain. Strict observation of it, therefore, does not 
provide the kind of great illumination that sensory experience provided for Galileo, but rather a feeble, 
flickering flame. The unforeseeable variation of social reality over time, with respect to the reality 
considered by the initial control observations, makes senseless both of the extremes in the succession 
O-H-Oc. The application of such a methodology to social events requires (as we saw) the hypothesis 
that reality means necessity (i.e., what happened had to happen), which ignores the optional or creative 
aspect of social life; in fact, the simple assumption that alternative choices or events were possible 
makes the method based on strict observation logically indefensible. The worst of it all is that the great 
intensity of the evolutionary processes makes such a method absolutely misleading, with the exception 
of some limited and circumspect use in macro economic theory. 
Put another way, the O-H-Oc method is based on the idea of spontaneous phenomena (and this is 
also true in the case in which events are reproduced through experiments) and the discovery of laws 
of motion through the observation of such phenomena. This hypothesis implies the acceptance of  
existence and allows for an efficient method of inquiry into the natural world, since this latter is not 
a product of human action; more precisely, human action may indeed interact with nature, but it 
does not play a constitutive role in nature. The application of the O-H-Oc method to social reality 
thus implies the idea of spontaneous social order, which is a misleading idea that denies the aim and 
the object of social life. In fact (and as we have seen), social order is a result of human action (we 
must  beg the  pardon of  our  readers  for  further  repetitions  of  this  statement,  but  it  is  crucial).  
Therefore, humanity is not obliged to limit itself to observation in order to understand; rather, he is  
allowed to investigate the reason why the social order is like it is and thereby manage to improve it . 
The natural scientists and methodologists of the seventeenth century enacted a decisive advance 
when they objected to the Medieval dominant idea of speculating on the reason why the natural 
world is as it  is that  such a speculation was a waste of time,  natural world being the work of 
unfathomable  divine  will.  These  methodologists  recommended,  rather,  a  commitment  to  the 
understanding  of  nature  through  its  accurate  observation.  This  recommendation  became  a  real 
dogma that has also been transmitted to social thought. But while, on the one hand, every physical 
attribution of men, animals or, at large, nature, being the result of a long and slow evolutionary 
process, can be profitably studied on the basis of the observational method, on the other hand, in the 
study of human societies, which are the result of human work (not divine will), the inquiry on the  
reason way society has been organized in the way we see (as Medieval  thinking suggested)  is 
crucial; so that an organizational view combining (as we shall see) being and doing, is much more  
appropriate.12 
11 The whole route of human history is characterized by the indefatigable search for successful innovations in order to 
achieve power; this phenomenon is particularly evident in the modern economy, where competition is mainly based on 
innovations.
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   Let us insist on this point: the hypothesis of uniformity and repetition that underpins the O-H-Oc 
method,  if  it  is  to  be extended to social  reality,  requires the collateral  hypothesis  of stationary 
motion, and hence stagnation, which is to say, a vegetative life. But as Man himself is the creator of 
human society, it is senseless to simply observe society, accepting it as it is, and so learn to interact 
with it as is typical of human relation with natural reality.  It is important to learn how to build 
society with accuracy. Even if we are analysing a repetitive society, if we refuse to accept it and 
suppose the transition to a different (and, in particular, a dynamic) one, we implicitly reject the 
hypothesis of repetition. Therefore, social thought cannot limit itself to a merely observational kind 
of rationality, i.e., one based on the idea of a long-run spontaneous process of rationalisation of the 
kind typical of nature; it needs, so to speak, a  constructivist rationality.13 Unfortunately, the great 
prestige achieved by the merely observational method in natural sciences induces contemporary 
students  of  society  to  make  widespread  use  of  it  and  implicitly  seek,  as  a  consequence,  to 
understand that which is a result of human activity as if it  were not, and to restrict  its field of 
inquiry to being and, so, to deny the scientific nature of doing.
To make clearer just how unsuitable the observational method is for inquiring into social reality, 
let  us  imagine  we want  to  study a  bureaucratic  social  system.  Observation  would  allow us  to 
understand its functioning. For instance, it would show that the system tends to suffocate creative 
processes and to promote stationary repetitive motion, this being congenial to bureaucratic decision-
making.  But  if  we  want  to  go  deeper  into  the  path  of  transition  from  this  to  some  other 
organizational  form, we need an alternative methodology to positivism; specifically,  we need a 
method consisting  of:  a)  comparison with  some different  social  systems  (analogical  procedure) 
aimed  at  discovering  better  organizational  forms;  or  b)  the  definition  of  some  methodological 
procedure and rules capable of enabling us to understand what mere observation hides,  i.e.  the 
reason for the inefficiencies of the society under examination, and indicating the way to eliminate 
them.
As a matter of fact, only procedure (b) is possible. Procedure (a) requires the existence of superior 
societies, which may not exist; moreover, it may cause serious mistakes. In fact, every social system 
includes  both  institutions  that  are  indispensable  to  its  functioning  and  other  aspects  that  are 
contingent, ‘optional’. This means that there is a risk of confusing what we shall call necessity with 
choice-possibility in the interpretation and organization of social systems; and there is a consequent 
risk that the imitation of the supposedly “superior” system will adopt some undesirable aspects in 
the belief that they are indispensable to its functioning. 
To deepen and better  reflect  upon these questions,  we turn now to discuss the meaning of the 
rationality principle with regard to social reality. We apologize for some repetition, which seems to be 
called for, however, if we really are to clarify and to overcome some widespread misunderstandings.
 The notion  of  rationality  considered  here  does  not  refer  simply  to  the  optimization  of  some 
objective  function under  the constraint  of  given means.  It  also refers to  the rationality  achieved 
through selection and includes forms of limited rationality imposed by the high degree of uncertainty 
(i.e. by the lack of knowledge) characterizing social systems and by the consequent impossibility of 
precisely defining means that induce people to take decisions on the basis of simpler conventional 
procedures. Besides, the concept of rationality concerns here the building of social structures and 
12 The omission of doing has been justified by positivist social scientists through an interpretation of the Hume’s law 
according to which it is a logical mistake to move from being to doing or, in other words, a prescriptive statement 
cannot be rationally grounded. Let us insist that this is true for nature (and hence for the observational-experimental 
method pertaining to this), since doing does not exists in nature. But as we shall see, a method appropriate for the  
understanding of social reality must first of all concern itself with combining being and doing.
13 Scholars often say that the objectivity of the social studies is undermined by the fact that Man is both agent and  
observer; but this ignores the fact that what is relevant for science is the objectivity of the scientist, not of Man as such.  
Moreover,  hermeneutics  maintains that  as Man is part  of  society,  intuition is  fundamental  in understanding social  
phenomena;  but,  unfortunately  (or  fortunately),  everybody has  his  own  intuition!  We can  see,  therefore,  that  our  
methodological  distinction between natural  and social  reality  rests  on reasons  different  from those emphasized by 
Dilthey, Rickert and – as we shall see extensively – Weber.
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institutions:  we  do  not  consider  these  as  given,  i.e.  as  a  part  of  the  constraint  system  of  an 
optimization problem, but rather as some entities that require an accurate explanation.
 There can be no doubt that selection propels spontaneous social behaviour toward the surprising 
harmonies generated by unintentional behavior, as underlined by Hegel's cunning of universal reason 
that would use individuals’ action to achieve his highest ends, and the Smithian invisible hand. But the 
evolutionary movement of society, being a much more intensive movement than that of nature, and 
generating  as  a  consequence  higher  uncertainty  and lack  of  knowledge,  make  learning  by doing 
crucial.  Together  with  other  numerous  rigidities,  this  fact  may  cause  frequent  nonlinearities, 
dependence on initial conditions (hysteresis) and even chaotic behavior. There is more. Social selection 
does not exhibit the inflexibility distinctive of the natural world selection, being affected by voluntary 
actions concerning choices of value, the building of institutions, normative interventions in sum, the 
enormous variety of motives and behaviours characterizing human action, the most part of which have 
very feeble counterparts in the life of other species. This implies the emergence, with respect to natural 
reality, of a much larger number of oppositions, contradictions and inefficiencies during the adjustment 
process toward equilibrium based on trial  and error, and a persistent violation of the equilibrating 
tendency. More precisely, the drive toward spontaneous order and efficiency emphasized, as we shall 
see, by Smith, Mandeville, Hayek and the Weberian principle of ‘diffuse rationality’, according to 
which in the long run everything settles down automatically, is not warranted in a world continuously 
shaken  by  innovations.  Furthermore,  path  dependency  and  ‘lock  in’  phenomena  (that  is  their 
dependence  on and imprisonnement  in previous  paths)  slow the flexibility  of social  systems and 
accentuate the rise of fractures. 
 The much larger errors and fluctuations of the social  than the biological process are amplified 
further by the impulses and passions (that D. Hume’s enquiry emphasizes) that characterize much of 
human  action.  Hobbes’  Leviathan  has  lucidly  underlined  the  destabilizing  effects  that  the 
unconstrained use of human intelligence for the satisfaction of the passions of individuals may have on 
social life. But it is important to stress that these considerations are far from obscuring the role of the 
rationality  principle.  On  the  contrary,  they  increase  the  need  to  accurately  deepen  the  meaning, 
contents and implications of such a principle. The above-mentioned big errors and inefficiencies of the 
trial  and error process cannot be accepted as unavoidable,  as simply a cruel cost imposed by the 
impersonal evolutionary mechanism of the struggle for existence generating the spontaneous order 
through selection. 
Of course,  unintentional  phenomena and lack of knowledge are extremely important  aspects of 
reality,  as  Hayek  points  out.  Spontaneous  behaviour  and  the  freedom of  individuals  are  crucial 
conditions for creativity and innovation, so that human knowledge is obliged to grow through trial and 
error. Besides, human beings need competition in order to improve; the repression of emulation and 
competition generates corruption, sclerosis and decline. But a task of human intelligence is to reduce 
the errors that the unfolding of the social processes generates. It is a cynical and mystifying nonsense 
to extend to the social system the identities that the real means the rational and that reality means 
necessity, which, as we saw, can be attributed to the natural world.  Social scientists deny their own 
true methods and facilitate criticism by empirical historians if they accept the identity between reality  
and rationality on which the method of natural science, based on observation, is founded. Their task is  
in fact to develop and improve rationality in the organization of social systems (this being the result of  
human action), and hence the explanation and administration of those systems so as to minimize the  
errors and difficulties that accompany the auto-selective gravitation toward order and efficiency. 
The content of the social sciences is both explanatory and normative.  They require, therefore, a 
stronger  notion  of  rationality  than  do  the  natural  sciences.  More  precisely,  mere  observational  
rationality based on the identity between reality and rationality (and instrumental rationality, that is,  
concerning the acquisition of means) is not sufficient in social science; it needs to be complemented by 
a  constructivist  notion  of  rationality  also  concerning  values  and  ends,  imposed  by  the  frequent 
violations of the above identity (between reality and rationality) that occur in social reality (where it 
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embodies only a mere long run tendency) and by the pursuit of programmatic objectives. This is the 
reason why social theory must simultaneously be a science of being and of doing.
It is well known that the comprehension of social processes through the method O-H-Oc implies 
much greater difficulties than when applied to the natural world. This fact can be considered a sign of 
the inadequacy of the above method as applied to social reality that, being generated by human beings, 
should be, in many of its aspects, easier to understand than natural world – as Vico pointed out many 
years ago.
3.  To  avoid  confusion,  it  may  be  useful  to  point  out  that  the  extension  of  the  observational-
experimental method from the study of nature to social thought has taken two forms. One may be 
denominated the  strong observational method  or social positivism (including also neo-positivism 
and falsificationism) and consists in the full adoption within the social sphere of the two hypotheses 
of acceptance of existing reality and the repetitiveness of observed phenomena. The other form may 
be denominated the  weak observational method or  social spontaneity. This second form excludes 
the hypothesis of repetitiveness in recognition of the increasingly central role of innovation within 
modern  dynamic  societies,  but  retains  the  acceptance  of  existence  and,  therefore,  a  merely 
observational  attitude.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  strong  observational  method  also  embraces 
spontaneity, for the acceptance of existence always implies a spontaneous view.  But as we have 
just seen, the weak observational method limits itself to the acceptance of existence and rejects the 
hypothesis  of  repetitiveness,  thereby  escaping  the  positivist  standard  typical  of  strong 
observationism;14 it has, therefore, a higher spontaneity standard. What is important for our thesis is 
simply that both the weak and the strong observational  methods erase the main significance of 
human action. The underlying idea is, as we have said, that what happened had to happen, implying 
the acceptance of existence. In a word, both of these methods direct effort at the understanding of 
spontaneous behavior. This means that both strong and weak observational methods exclude reform 
action. Reform is, in principle, inconsistent with the observational method that highlights being at  
the expense of doing. The consequence has been a growing inability of social thinking to illuminate 
reform-orientated action, as we shall see extensively later.
In the age of commercial revolution, social changes caused by the growth of capitalism were for 
the most part interpreted, at least by the sharpest scholars, on the basis of the weak observational 
method, i.e. as spontaneous but non-repetitive behavior. The attitude of economists, who analyzed 
the most dynamic subsystem of society,  is illuminating in this regard. Political economists were 
attracted by the idea of a so-called ‘invisible hand’ that, driven by personal interest and by way of 
the market,  seemed able to fulfill  automatically the great variety of people’s needs and, on the 
whole,  warrant  the  coherence  of  many  non-repetitive  decisions  operating  separately  from one 
another and even, at  times,  in reciprocal opposition.  Writing at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century,  Bernard  Mandeville  described  in  colorful  terms  «the  vileness  of  the  ingredients  that 
represent on the whole the healthy mixture of a well ordered society»,15 and described the operation 
of the social process as a whole in terms of the transformation of ‘private vices into public benefit’.
The first industrial revolution did not much disturb the existing reality,  at least with respect to 
more recent increasing social change. While it is true that the discontinuities caused by innovation 
have always caused difficulties in the understanding and management of society, nevertheless, in 
spite of such initial intensification of social change, the social thought of the nineteenth century was 
dominated  by  positivism.  More  precisely,  the  weak  observation  method,  which  rejects  the 
hypothesis of the repetition of events and only postulates their spontaneity, prevailed. This method 
has  permeated  the  most  important  lines  of  social  thinking:  free  trade  and  social  naturalism, 
evolutionary and historicist thought of various kinds. Its basic fault is to be centered on an exclusive 
regarding of being and disregarding of doing. An outstanding example is Weberian teaching that, 
14 The weak observational method is not absent in the study of natural phenomena, e.g. Darwinian teaching as centered 
on accidental mutations. 
15 (B Mandeville 1984), p.3 
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while on the one side gives a great importance to ethical values, on the other side considers value in 
a merely observational perspective that provides an explanation of ethical values through the idea of 
‘diffuse rationality’, stating their supposed approach by trial and error toward right ethical values. 
The Marxian  inspiration  to  Darwinian  evolutionism and to  Hegel’s  philosophical  teaching  (the 
dialectical  motion  toward  improvement  and  the  identification  of  reality  with  reason),  strongly 
resembles the ‘diffuse rationality’; in fact, Marx eluded the question of the organization of social 
system (doing), leaving the matter to the ‘fancy of history’.  Thanks to these various schools of 
thought,  the  spontaneous  vision gained,  both implicitly  and explicitly,  a  considerable  influence 
within social thought. 
Over the course of time,  some theoretical  advancement  has made the management  of human 
societies an easier task. But, in the form of the weak observational method, the spontaneous view 
continues  to  dominate  social  thinking.  This  domination  is  strengthened  by  the  absence  of  an 
alternative social theory that is methodologically and hence scientifically well founded. In fact, such 
absence frequently leads to considerable mistakes in ‘constructivist’ interventions intended to revise 
the  tendency  of  social  processes,  and  these  mistakes  can  accentuate  the  pains  associated  with 
spontaneous tendencies, thus making it convenient, in practice, to opt for the original spontaneous 
tendencies.
There do exist, within social thought, some non-observational theories. For example, the doctrines 
of natural rights, juridical positivism and contractual thinking conjugate the observational and the 
organizational points of view. But they very frequently fail to take into account the importance of 
accurately integrating being and doing. As we shall see extensively in the second part of this book, 
the very expression ‘natural  rights’  is  inspired by the idea of constraint  (being),  from which it 
derives  some  teaching  on  social  organization,  while  the  theory  of  juridical  positivism  prefers 
freedom  and  the  coherence  of  social  order.  For  its  part,  contractual  thinking  is  inclined  to 
undervalue de facto reality and hence to develop the question of the organization of the social 
system according to a very abstract standard.16 There is more. Constructivist approaches do exactly 
the opposite of observational method; they consider social reality in the perspective of doing, that 
is, disregarding being: an exaggeration no less misleading than the observational one. This is typical 
of the programmatic approach that we shall critically discuss at the end of chapter 2 with reference 
to economic and social planning.
 
1.3  Necessity  and  choice-possibility-creativeness  in  the  organization  and  interpretation  of 
social systems
1.3.1 Freedom and constraints
Human societies are the outcome of conscious and unconscious human actions, but the building 
process is by no means completely free; social organization and government are not unconstrained. 
Creativity, intuition and even the most fearless human initiatives must always encounter de facto 
reality  and,  consequently,  a  variety  of  constraints.  This  is  fairly  self-evident,  and  in  fact  the 
distinction between ‘freedom’ and ‘constraint’, between that which is the object of choice and that 
which is constrained by preexisting reality in the building of human societies, is not ignored by 
social  thought.  Nevertheless,  engagement  with  it  is  afflicted  by  heavy  ambiguities,  which  are 
difficult  to  defeat  because  they  are  the  result  of  and,  at  the  same  time,  a  deep  cause  of 
misunderstandings on method. It may seem at first sight that the distinction between freedom and 
constraint is well expressed by constrained optimization models or, more precisely, the objective 
function and the constraints of those models. But this is not the case. The distinction is prior to such 
modeling; as such, it concerns both the objective function (primarily through ethical values with 
16 In  particular,  Rawls’  principles  of  justice,  which  provide  the  basis  of  the  most  recent  and  severe  forms  of  
contractualism, do not really clarify the distinction between objective and subjective aspects, between freedom and 
constriction. See (H. Ekstedt & A. Fusari 2010), chapter 3, pp. 82-84. 
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their subjective or – as we shall see – objective character) and the constraints (primarily technology 
and institutions that do not simply express constraints but also imply choice and creativeness). All 
this, let us note, will be extensively clarified later, at the end of chapter 2.
It is neither surprising nor reprehensible that ancient students of society neglected the opposition 
between freedom and constraint. The substantial invariableness of the operational mechanisms of 
their societies favored their perfection and consolidation in the course of time, while the field of 
freedom did not significantly affect the generation of these societies and their quasi-naturalistic 
standards. The most appropriate way to understand their functioning was, therefore, the observation 
of  phenomena  in  order  to  discover  the  mechanisms  behind  a  repetitiveness  that  was  only 
exceptionally interrupted by traumatic events, such as invasions, rebellions, or natural disasters. 
The management of stationary social processes requires a regulatory rationality, i.e. one directed to 
perfect the coherence of the system. The invariableness of these social systems is protected by some 
fairly pristine pillars, such as the legitimization of power over time as habit to subjection generates 
the consent of the governed. Such quasi-repetitive societies are, therefore, easy to govern, provided 
that they benefit from some solid institutional and administrative support in the form of experienced 
and  faithful  civil  servants  and  a  strong  and  enduring  value  system.  Chinese  mandarins  and 
Confucian ethics,  marked as is the latter  by respect for hierarchy,  a well defined distinction of 
functions, the suffocation of creativity,  worship of tradition, and reverence for the elderly,  have 
constituted  one  of  the  most  appropriate  organizational  forms  for  the  government  of  stationary 
societies that has appeared in the course of history.17 
The advent, in some Western countries, of self-propelled development, has upset this traditional 
state of affairs in society and government. In such countries, the repetitiveness of social phenomena 
began increasingly to be contradicted by the advent of novelties, generated primarily by competition 
based  on  innovation.  The  distinction  between  freedom  and  constraint  gained  in  importance, 
rendering social studies based on the mere observation of existing phenomena less and less reliable. 
Under  such conditions,  the investigator  is  obliged  to  disentangle  the place  of  the  two poles  of 
freedom and constraint  in  the generation  of human societies.  Identifying  the pole of constraint 
allows discovery of uniformities and steady (or almost steady) points that can be used as Pole stars 
in  the  attempt  to  navigate  the  laws  and  regularities  standing  behind  the  organization  and 
management of modern Western dynamic social systems.
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Earth  has  long  been  home  to  a  large  variety  of  cultural  areas  and 
civilizations enjoying reciprocal relations. But these external relations with different ‘worlds’ did 
not define their identities and did not act as a prime stimulus of change. Until some decades ago 
communities separated by only a few kilometers and situated in the heart of important industrial 
countries  preserved  a  strongly  autochthonous  physiognomy.  The  recent  progress  of 
telecommunications  has  almost  annihilated  large  distances  between  geographical  regions;  the 
progress of transportation has accentuated this trend; and the processes of globalization that have 
followed have brought within their compass even the most isolated societies of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
New technologies generate new needs, new consumption and ethical values with rapidity. An abyss, 
or at least something near to it, now separates the ways of thinking and the sentiments of successive 
generations. The population of underdeveloped countries threatens to overflow into rich countries. 
Some  consolidated  forms  of  income  distribution  become  untenable  and  enter  into  crisis.  The 
struggle between old and new solutions becomes acute and the collision among cultures becomes 
violent. 
17 For the most part, ancient societies were careful to sanction the intangibility and consecration of inherited values,  
institutions and usages. On the whole, intellectual inquiries were not directed to the discussion of such contents, but  
rather evoked new horizons and aimed at the acquisition of immutable truths, as in the case of Plato’s ideas (Plato’s 
teacher Socrates of course proving an exception, his fate pointing to a perceived incompatibility between such exception 
and the stability of ancient society). There were in addition comparative analyses, such as we find in the political works  
of  Aristotle  and  Polybius,  but  such  comparisons  always  served  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  stability  and  
repetitiveness in social processes across the cyclical vicissitudes of institutional forms.
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As already noted, the observation of so much spontaneous movement and so many phenomena 
that  overlap  themselves  and contradict  one another,  rather  than  illuminating  the  understanding, 
actually causes confusion. We therefore come to perceive the growing importance within social 
thought  for  the  articulation  and  illustration  of  alternative  ways  of  discovering  some  common 
necessities, attractions of the adjustment processes and long-term organizational pillars. To achieve 
such goals becomes an indispensable condition if humanity is to see what it has become, if people 
are to engage in meaningful dialogue and civilizations and cultures are to preserve their identity and 
hence their abilities to feed on a variety of fecund inspirations, and if those who hold power are to 
base their decisions upon useful knowledge.
So the most effective and natural way of obtaining knowledge about social reality is not only 
represented by the transition from the observational to the organizational view but needs also to be 
concentrated in the distinction between constraint and freedom. 
1.3.2 A more expressive distinction: necessity and choice-possibility
We will now articulate the distinction between freedom and constraints by way of a terminology 
that seems to us more appropriate and incisive, specifically, in terms of the place of ‘necessity’ and 
‘choice-possibility-creativeness’  (henceforth,  simply:  choice-possibility)  in  the  organization  and 
management of social systems. Organizational necessities are not an observational matter; in fact,  
history shows that they can be ignored, largely violated in practice and even strongly opposed and  
denied. It is also immediately evident that the term that refers to freedom, that is choice-possibility, 
has  not,  by its  nature,  an observational  substance and hence cannot  be studied and understood 
through observation. Let us examine this more closely.
The observation of a storm at sea does not allow for the discovery of the laws of the motions of 
the waves. But the circumstance that the observation of some strong and much perturbed behavior is 
unable to teach something does not imply the impossibility of understanding. Every organizational 
system rests on a proper logic; the problem is to understand the terms of this logic, with the aim of  
distinguishing the important from the ephemeral aspects, the steady points from what can fluctuate 
and transform almost at the drop of a hat. If we lack the skill to do this, global society will appear 
more and more like an unintelligible storm at sea and spontaneous adjustments will not save us 
from the violence of the wind or lessen the danger of being drowned.
To understand social  processes we must  concentrate  on the field of ‘necessity’,  primarily the 
organizational (but also naturalistic) necessities. The study of historical processes (for instance, the 
transition from the feudal period to the mercantile society of the middle ages) clearly shows the 
strength of ‘necessity’  as represented, for example,  by the absolute need for proper institutions, 
power forms, ethical values and visions of the world in particular developmental phases, and their 
dispensability  in  others.  History  teaches  us,  moreover,  that  the  spontaneous  tendency  toward 
existing or emergent organizational ‘necessities’ has always incurred the risk of immense torments; 
in the cases in which it has been unsuccessful, social systems have been forced to regress toward 
antecedent  phases  of  development.  The  dimension  of  such  torments  (inflicted  by  spontaneous 
behavior) tends, let us repeat, to grow with the acceleration of development processes and social 
change;  this  gives  rise  to  a  pressing  need to  scientifically  arrange  and specify  ‘necessity’  and 
‘choice-possibility’.
Before going on to unveil, in the next chapter, a methodological proposal aimed at allowing the 
student of society to face in a systematic way the situation just outlined, it may be useful here to 
sketch  some  examples  of  the  distinction  between  ‘necessity’  and  ‘choice-possibility’.  Some 
supplementary commentary upon Mandeville’s  analysis  may be useful  in  this  regard.  We have 
previously seen how Mandeville was fascinated by the tendency of complex European economies to 
automatically  generate  consistency  (at  least,  in  the  main)  out  of  many  reciprocally  clashing 
decisions. Scottish social philosophers also subsequently paid great attention to this phenomenon. 
They all perceived clearly that the author of such a marvel was the market, and a number of them 
attributed to it the character of natural law. But the market is simply an ‘organizational necessity’ of 
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modern dynamic economies,  since the limits  of human knowledge and the presence of growing 
flows  of  radical  uncertainty  caused  by innovation  make  futile  any  attempt  to  govern  dynamic 
economies through centralized decision making.
The development of those organizational forms particularly suited to modern dynamic economies 
makes evident, not only the necessity of the market, but also that of the entrepreneur and hence of 
the profit rate (where this last term is not intended as a category of income distribution but simply 
as an accountability indicator, that is, an indispensable marker in terms of the need to define the 
degree  of  success  and  hence  the  responsibility  for  decision  making).  This  triad  (market, 
entrepreneur and profit rate) expresses the basic mechanism of dynamic competition and economic 
development;18 it  is  not required in stationary societies  as their  repetitiveness can be efficiently 
managed by bureaucratic decision-making. In fact, the presence of the market in ancient societies 
represented a mere historical contingency and market agents could be persecuted, expropriated and 
suppressed without significant consequences to the efficiency of production.
This  explanation  of  the  market,  the  entrepreneur  and  profit  is  based  on  organizational 
considerations  and  not  only  differs  from  current  economic  theories  but  also  clarifies  some 
misunderstandings  caused  by  them.  To  give  but  one  example:  the  most  influential  economic 
theories  consider  the  market  concretely  observed,  that  is,  the  capitalist  market,  which  implies 
particular forms of income distribution. The shortcoming of these observational theories lies in the 
fact  that  they  disregard  the  separation  of  ‘necessity’  from  ‘choice-possibility’  and,  more 
specifically,  are disinclined to separate ‘necessity’ from other contents that are simply typical of 
capitalist civilization. The result has been a harsh and unsolvable conflict among the supporters and 
the opponents of the capitalist market. What is worst, the opponents of the market, disgusted by the 
injustice, deceits, immoralities and oppression attached to it, have hoped for the suppression of the 
market tout court.19 An organizational (as opposed to observational) view and, more specifically, 
the distinction between ‘necessity’ and ‘choice-possibility’ in the organization of social systems, 
allows  the  avoidance  of  these  misunderstandings  by way of  the  clarification  that  the  capitalist  
features of the economy (and of the market) belong to the realm of choice-possibility while the 
market by itself is an organizational necessity of dynamic economies. This allows a demonstration 
that Mandeville’s statement of the usefulness, in complex and dynamic societies, of the vileness of 
human behavior, may be true from an observational view but not from an organizational one. In 
fact, from the observational statement (and evidence) of the conversion of private vices into public 
benefit it can easily be deduced that robberies are useful to society.  Such a statement stimulates 
thefts, to the utmost joy of the lawyers in The Fable of Bees. But this baseness is not indispensable; 
it can be separated from the market intended as an organizational necessity and erased.20 
The  market  competition  implies  some  ethical  values  such  as  pluralism,  decentralization, 
individual initiative and tolerance. These values represent organizational ‘necessities’ of dynamic 
evolutionary societies; they have, therefore, an objective substance (that relativists, starting from 
Weber and Myrdal’s  teaching,  strongly oppose) that,  as such, can be scientifically proved. The 
above values go well beyond the specific capitalist substance of the market; they are necessary to 
18 A detailed analysis of this subject may be found in (A. Fusari 2005b), and in: (H. Ekstedt & A. Fusari 2010), mainly 
chapters 5 and 8. 
19 The misunderstandings considered have been accompanied by others caused by senseless abstractions; for instance, 
those typical of neoclassical economics which model the market leaving out of consideration the entrepreneur and profit 
(this last being identified merely with interest on capital), and also leaving out of consideration innovation and radical 
uncertainty.
20 The race toward moral perversion is greatly anterior to Mandeville’s teaching and is deeply rooted in a world the 
operational mechanisms of which have always been largely based on cheating and intrigues; a world that has been 
largely inspired by the following ancient saying: “The burglar of a kingdom is praiseworthy, but he who robs too little  
deserves prison”. Byzantine theology gave merit to him who succeeded in becoming emperor, even if he ascended to 
imperial  power through the worst crimes. The guiding idea here was that sovereignty came from God’s will, thus  
forgetting that frequently sovereign power has been Satan’s armed hand. It is time to take to flight from these cynical  
stupidities. 
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the expression of the evolutionary potentialities of humanity or, in other words, are necessary to the 
operation of the large variety of individual skills that collectively constitute an enormous reservoir 
of skills. These subjects will be more deeply considered later on.
Another organizational necessity of modern dynamic economies is represented by the principle of 
‘effective demand’ and is a consequence of the fact that, in the presence of radical uncertainty, a 
deficiency  (or  excess)  of  effective  demand  is  likely,  thus  causing  the  exigency  payoff  paying 
attention to the equilibrium between global demand and supply in the management of the economy. 
Some implications  that  institutional  scholars  of different  schools of  thought  have derived from 
uncertainty with reference to the theory of the firm, for instance via the notion of transaction costs, 
also represent organizational ‘necessities’ in our sense. We shall see later that ‘globalization’ has 
raised to prominence some important organizational necessities that concern the relation between 
production and income distribution, financial markets and political power.
Now let us consider some examples of ‘choice-possibility’. A large variety of forms of income 
distribution can be associated with the market and the entrepreneurial system. In fact, for the variety 
of individual skills to operate, monetary incentives much lower than those typical of capitalism are 
required,  everyone  being largely  gratified  by the  simple  possibility  of  making  use  of  his  own 
capacities  and propensities.  The existence  of  large  income inequalities,  profligate  utilization  of 
wealth  and  a  purely  acquisitive  conception  of  life,  represent  contingent  and  observational 
conditions, not organizational necessities. It derives from this fact that income distribution (with the 
exception  of  material  incentives  strictly  required  for  performing  risky and alienating  activities) 
concerns choice-possibility.21
Another  kind  of  choice-possibility  is  represented  by  the  adoption  of  different  forms  of 
entrepreneurship and financial system. Finance should be a servant of production but, in practice, 
the role is reversed: production is dominated by capitalist finance in the context of globalization. 
Some  other,  clearer  and  more  efficient  financial  systems  are  possible  in  principle.22 Great 
importance must be attributed to aspects of choice-possibility of long duration and represented by 
the great ethical-ideological options that provide the identity of  civilizations. These options take 
root and display a decisive influence on the functioning of human societies. They begin to waver 
when they become inconsistent with new organizational ‘necessities’. This inconsistency marks the 
starting point of a difficult and delicate phase of transition, as we shall see more extensively in 
chapter 4. 
To understand the main contents of the emerging crises, it is important to place knowledge about 
necessity and knowledge about choice-possibility side by side. Among other things, the absence of 
such a distinction (or the existence of heavy confusions in the matter) deprives social reform of a 
compass, or perhaps supplies it with one that indicates North in the place of South, thereby entailing 
that  reform  advances  only  gropingly  and  falls  too  easily  into  dead  ends  and  discredit.  The 
knowledge of what is necessary is a condition of sensitizing public opinion about such necessity. 
Reform also requires an ability to discern what is possible, to assign a degree of preference to the 
various  possibilities,  and  a  coherence  that  ensures  an  awareness  of  the  dividing  line  between 
necessity  and possibility.  A lot  of  reforms,  after  a  difficult  introduction,  have  fallen  into  total 
discredit and ultimately have been cancelled, albeit only after having caused serious damage; and 
this is not even to speak of the tremendous dramas and failures spread by the great revolutions. 
Well, such failures have been caused mainly by ignorance of the distinction between necessity and 
choice-possibility, or a confusion of the one with the other. 
The distinction between what is necessary and what can be the object of choice or is the result of 
creative processes can significantly contribute to the reduction of the harshness of reforms. It can 
also  help  to  construct  consent.  In  particular,  the  distinction  helps  to  reduce  the  harshness  of 
21 This  aspect  has  been  developed extensively by A.  Fusari  in  chapter  8  of  Economic  theory  and social  change, 
Routledge, 2010.
22 More details on the matter are to be found in A. Fusari, Reason and domination, as well as section 5 of chapter 4 of 
this book
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conflicting interests  by making evident  the aspects of the social  system that cannot be refused. 
Moreover, such a distinction helps to attenuate the collision among civilizations, mainly through the 
assessment of the objectivity of important ethical values. Finally, it facilitates the combination of 
old and new values, the meeting of tradition and change, as well as the clarification of what is vital 
and what decaying or unpropitious among the elements of existing and emerging organizations.
It is also important to place the notion of ‘duration’ side by side with the distinction between 
necessity and choice-possibility. As we shall see extensively in section 3 of chapter 2, duration is a 
different thing from necessity. In fact, some important phenomena that in principle are optional are 
deeply rooted in existing reality, for instance civilizations. If these deeply rooted aspects obstruct 
and oppose important and necessary changes, a strong public mobilization must occur in order to 
remove them, but only the notion of ‘necessity’ can allow such a mobilization.
1.3.3 Some outstanding equivocations on economic and social necessities
A special issue of the Cambridge Journal of Economics has recently celebrated the works of P. 
Sraffa, in part by drawing from the abundant material  contained in his unpublished papers. The 
introductory article by S. Blankenburg, R. Arena and F. Wilkinson includes a section entitled ‘The 
role of technical and social factors in the distinction between necessities and surplus in the Sraffian 
system of reproduction’  that  emphasizes  the Sraffian notion of technical  and social  necessities. 
Social  necessities are seen as a consequence of the peculiarities of different social  systems,  for 
instance, corporate (managerial) capitalism with its separation of ownership from control, or the 
operation of the worldwide financial hegemony of capital.  But such a notion of social necessity 
mixes up necessity and choice-possibility, as becomes clear in light of our distinction between the 
two.  Probably this  is  a  consequence  of  the absence,  in  the Sraffian system of  prices,  of  basic 
necessities  of  a  dynamic  economy  that  are  independent  of  its  characterization  as  a  capitalist 
civilization: entrepreneurship, profit in its accountability role, innovation, radical uncertainty, etc. 
This absence undermines the Sraffian price system and prevents the founding of the discourse on 
surplus upon a notion of necessity amended by the reference to specific institutional and civilization 
choices. 
The statement that, in corporate firms with separation of ownership from control, wages and the 
interest  rate  on  capital  represent  social  necessities  of  capitalism,  and  that  also  the  heavy 
malfunctions  deriving  from  the  hegemonic  power  of  international  financial  capital  are  social 
necessities of capitalism, is not especially illuminating as capitalism represents a particular kind of 
civilization. The participants in the debate neglect the necessary role of entrepreneurship and the 
necessary presence of radical uncertainty in an economy where competition largely acts through 
innovation, and hence neglect the necessary role of the profit rate intended as a mere variable of 
accountability required to judge the degree of success of a manager’s action and decision-making, 
which is indispensable to control controllers. As far as I know, not one of the participants underlines 
that a true achievement of Sraffa’s work – the demonstration of the reswitching of techniques – 
undermines the ‘social necessity’ of the interest rate. As a matter of fact, reswitching implies that 
the level of the interest rate cannot be explained on the basis of the demand-supply of capital but 
instead  depends  (as  underlined  by  Keynes)  on  the  demand-supply  of  money  and  that,  as  a 
consequence, the real interest rate can be eliminated in principle while preserving its nominal terms 
as a counterpart of inflation in order to defend saving. The necessity of the entrepreneurial profit 
rate in its accountability role prevents the wasting of capital, but such a necessity is ignored by neo-
Ricardian economics.
A  wider  breadth  and  an  appreciable  coherence  and  completeness  are  offered  by  Zamagni’s 
treatment  of the question  of necessity.  This  author’s  civil  economy underlines  the necessity  of 
market  relations,  social  justice  and the reciprocity  principle  in  order  to  allow,  respectively,  the 
efficiency, cohesion and the same survival of economic order in the age of global society with its 
milestone represented by the hegemony of the international financial market. We shall see that a 
powerful  way to  combine  the  three  above necessities  is  the  reduction  of  the market  to  a  pure 
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mechanism for the imputation of costs and efficiency that allows the maximum separation between 
efficiency and income distribution and hence a coherent combination of the first with both social 
justice and reciprocity. But a deep revision in the method of the social sciences, a revision primarily 
based on the organizational view of social systems, is needed in order to avoid current confusions 
on the three terms of the combination, for instance the association of the elimination of profit to the 
principles of reciprocity and fraternity;  in fact, this elimination overlooks the importance of the 
profit rate in its accountability role mentioned just above, the profit rate being (let us repeat) the 
only reliable  measure of the degree of success of entrepreneurial  decision making,  the issue of 
distribution aside. This means that there is no opposition between profit, from one side, and social 
justice and reciprocity from the other. One of the major afflictions of social thought is represented 
by  equivocal  mixings  between  necessity  and  choice-possibility  in  the  organization  of  social 
systems. We shall see that these mixings afflict the most important social theories. 
1.4  A primary methodological misunderstanding in the social sciences: the conflict between 
normative and positive views
To prepare the ground for the exposition, in the next chapter, of my proposal on method, it seems 
opportune to consider here the opposition, in economics and social thought, between positive and 
normative elements. It may be useful, in this regard, to refer to a study by Valeria Mosini centered  
on a criticism of Friedman’s ideas on method.23 Her study goes well beyond a mere criticism of 
Friedman, both in what it says and what it implies.
   Mosini rejects the position on method that Friedman borrows from the natural sciences, that is, the 
positivist idea of discovering laws of motion through observation and, subsequently, the use of the 
laws so discovered in order to formulate prescriptions of political economy.  She underlines that 
such a methodology implies a total submission of normative to positive elements, and as such a 
substantial negation of the normative. In parallel, Mosini repeatedly condemns Friedman’s disdain 
for the realism of assumptions and his corresponding explicit acceptance of a complete unrealism of 
assumptions, making evident that such a position is contradictory with respect to the above positive 
standard.  More  generally,  Mosini  takes  pains  to  clarify  the  fact  that  Friedman’s  supposed 
contribution to the method of economics fails to establish a true scientific standard. 
   We have seen in the previous sections that observations concerning a reality affected by frequent 
innovations do not allow the specification and verification of laws of motion. Friedman manages to 
overcome such a difficulty by associating the validation of theories with their ability to generate 
correct predictions, irrespective of their degree of realism. But as a matter of fact the growing non-
repetitiveness of social events caused by innovation also makes void the forecasting power of the 
supposed economic laws, particularly if these are not based on realistic assumption (in section 6 of 
the next chapter we show that economic and social forecasts can only operate in very narrow ambits 
and that, to may be effective, those forecasts require a very different method).
   Without doubt, a conjunction of disdain for the realism of assumptions and a celebration of 
positive  method  is  contradictory.  In  fact,  mainstream  economics  uses  the  method  of  abstract 
rationality (that excludes the realism of assumptions) and the observational-experimental method 
separately,  employing sometimes the first and at other times the second. In so doing it has both 
achieved great intellectual  success and subordinated the normative to  the positive.  Why such a 
success?
   Mosini discusses the relationship between positive and normative elements in the works of some 
important economists: J. S. Mill, H. Sidgwick, F. Y. Edgeworth, L. Robbins, A. Marshall, A. C.  
Pigou, L. Walras, and J. Neville Keynes. In each case, she makes evident their concern with the 
normative side of economic problems. But such attention to the normative has been placed in the 
shadow by the ever-increasing abundance within economics of the methods of the logic-formal and 
23 See V. Mosini, Reassessing the paradigm of economics, Routledge 2011
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natural  sciences.  We  must  ask  ourselves  the  reason  why  the  normative  good  sense  of  these 
renowned older has so easily been defeated by the subsequent Neoclassical impact on the method of 
social thought. It seems evident that the success of Neoclassical economics has been made possible 
because the attention to the normative side by such economists as just noted collided with the well-
tested methodologies of the logic-formal and natural sciences (which latter are accurately used by 
Neoclassical economics), while those with normative concerns failed to build an alternative method 
appropriate  to  social  reality,  thus  leaving unstated  the true  implication  of  their  criticism.  Even 
today, this indifference to method weakens attempts to avoid the suffocation of the normative by the 
positive,  as  implied  by the  use  of  the  method  of  the  natural  sciences.  It  seems  to  us  that  the  
revaluation of the normative side to the detriment of the positive that Mosini extracts  from the 
works  of  those  important  economists  mentioned  above  is  not  relevant  by  itself;  indeed  the 
normative is not amended by methodological  misunderstandings,  even if they be different from 
positivist-naturalist ones. Nevertheless, such a revaluation of the normative side is important since it 
allows  for  the  perception  that  the  distinction  positive-normative  needs  to  be  overcome  and 
appropriately replaced. Let us clarify this matter.
     We have previously shown that the method of the social sciences must strictly combine positive  
and normative aspects, being and doing, within a unified method. We have also clarified that a 
different distinction plays an important methodological role: the distinction between ‘necessity’ and 
‘choice-possibility-creativeness’. This matter will be better explained in chapter 2, which is devoted 
to  the  presentation  of  our  proposal  on  method.  We  must  underline  here,  however,  that  the 
distinction  between  positive  and  normative  aspects  and  that  between  ‘necessity’  and  ‘choice-
possibility’  do  not  overlap:  some  necessities  and  choices-possibilities  are  present  both  in  the 
positive and normative sides, and vice-versa. To see this, it may be useful to recall some examples 
discussed in the previous section on necessity and choice-possibility.
   In that section, we have seen that, for instance, fundamental ethical values pertain to the side of 
necessity, while some others pertain to the field of choice-possibility. But values are always referred 
to the normative side by the predominant cultural relativism: in Mosini’s book the ethical aspects 
represent the main part of the normative aspect. Again, we have seen that a dynamic economy needs 
the entrepreneurial  role,  the market  and profit  rate  (taking the last  in  its  accountability  role  of 
indicator  of  the  degree  of  success  of  decision  making);  those  institutions  are  organizational 
‘necessities’ the cancellation of which pushes society toward a stationary state. We have also seen 
that a very large part of income distribution pertains to the field of ‘choice-possibility’. In sum, the 
market taken as a pure mechanism of imputation of costs and of efficiency,  and the connected 
entrepreneurial function, represent some organizational necessities of dynamic economies, while the 
capitalist market and the capitalist entrepreneur and profit, which are strictly linked to specific kinds 
of income distribution, pertain to the side of choice-possibility, that is, they express organizational 
and  value  options.  Normative  action  should  plainly  operate  on  the  side  concerning  choice-
possibility that, however, includes aspects currently attributed to the positive side, while it cannot  
concern the side of ‘necessity’ that, however, includes aspects currently attributed to the normative  
side.  Thus  the  distinction  between  necessity  and  choice-possibility  makes  evident  that  the  
distinction between positive and normative creates the potential for much confusion with regard to  
the  organization  and  management  of  social  systems.  The  absence  of  the  distinction  between  
necessity  and  choice-possibility  implies  confusion  with  regard  to  the  distinction  between  
endogenous and exogenous-instrumental variables.
   To perform a more profound exploration of these issues, it may be useful to refer to an important  
historical period that Mosini neglects. As we have seen, she points out that Neville Keynes focused 
on the normative side of economic questions. But she ignores the work of Neville’s son, J. M. 
Keynes, probably because he did not explicitly consider method. As is well known, J. M. Keynes 
underlines  the  importance  of  the  following  realistic  assumption:  a  dynamic  economy,  as 
characterized by high uncertainty and the role of expectations and hence an economy in which 
investment is a ‘flying bird’ is, by its nature, afflicted by a deficiency of demand and consequent 
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depression. This analysis points to the importance of the accurate management of final demand (and 
of  deficit  spending,  welfare  state,  etc.).  Clearly,  such  an  approach  amalgamates  positive  and 
normative elements,  being and doing, just  as our proposal on method sets  out;  in other words, 
Keynesian economics erases the distinction between economics and political economy, combining 
the two in a unitary explanatory and prescriptive approach. Well, such an amalgamation of positive  
and normative elements needs the distinction between ‘necessity’ and ‘choice-possibility’ if it is not  
to  be  misleading. In  the  absence  of  such  a  distinction,  the  amalgamation  amounts  simply  to 
programmatic  constructivism,  precisely,  that  is,  to  the  idea  that  important  social  and economic 
changes and transformations may be freely projected (as we shall see in section 7 of chapter 2). 
Economic  and social  planning,  promoted in  Western countries  by the Keynesian  teaching,  was 
condemned  to  failure  and  ultimately  condemnation  by  the  lack  of  perception  of  the  binary 
‘necessity’  and ‘choice-possibility’;  a lack that has entailed the subjection of programming to a 
crazy  constructivism.  In socialist  countries,  the  disdain  for  such a  distinction  had much  worse 
consequences; it resulted, indeed, in a dramatic foolishness of planning.   
   The failure of economic and social planning in ignoring basic ‘necessities’ unloosed a hinge that 
allowed  for  the  overturning  of  the  situation  and  an  increasing  acceptance  of  Friedman’s 
subordination of the normative to the positive. We must recognize that the misconceptions caused 
by the absence of the distinction between necessity and choice-possibility have been an enduring 
problem.
   In sum, Friedman’s positivist reaction to the damaged normative side of the economic question  
certainly  constitutes  a dead end; but the concentration on the normative side by,  for instance,  
returning  to  Keynes,  does  not  offer  a  remedy.  The  credibility  of  the  insistence  of  important 
economists upon the normative aspect, which Mosini underlines, has been damaged by the absence 
of methodological revisions that it should have inspired; as a consequence, any challenge on the 
part of the normative has been easily defeated by the use, by mainstream economics, of both the 
method of the logical-formal sciences and of that of natural sciences. A different (third) method was 
needed,  one based on the  character  of social  reality  and one which,  in  particular,  replaced the 
distinction between positive and normative with one similar to that which we propose.
   Criticisms of the market are grist to the neoliberal mill if the market is simply considered as 
capitalist market, thus transforming the necessity of the market into a purported necessity of the 
capitalist market. Of course, the notion of the market must be referred to a dynamic context if we 
intend by it to expresses a ‘necessity’. The distinction, in the analysis of the working of the market, 
between optimizing adaptation and innovation may cause equivocations.  Both optimization with 
given constraints and the change of constraints due to innovation are implied in the functioning of 
the  market.  Schumpeterian  innovation  causing  transitory  monopolies  expresses  competition 
(dynamic  competition);  this  kind of market  is different from and much more effective than the 
merely adaptive market,  typical  of a stationary economy where,  after  all,  the ‘necessity’  of the 
market does not arise. This point will be brought into sharper focus when we return to Schumpeter 
in section 8 of chapter 3.
   It seems to us that the careful clarification on method of Mosini is damaged by her problematic 
hope  for  “the  re-establishment  of  the  hegemony  of  normative  over  positive  economics”,24 an 
aspiration which she supports by quoting Emmer’s position: “Ethical premises are, in some sense, 
the ultimate criteria of conduct. However… they bear no logical necessity. Their force in society is 
measured by the ability of their advocates to impose their views on others, whether by force or by 
persuasion”.  We have  clarified  in  the  previous  section  that  basic  ethical  assumptions  have  an 
objective character,  are ‘necessities’  (that,  however,  may change with the general  conditions of 
development); if so, it  follows that the force of those ethical assumptions depends rather on the 
persuasive power of scientific  reasoning in showing the ‘necessity’  of the implied fundamental 
values.  Therefore,  the three concluding lines of Mosini’s book, assessing the importance of the 
24 See V. Mosini (2011), p. 139. 
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combination of will and hope in the attempt to defeat the neoliberal paradigm, do not seem to focus 
on the true problem: such a paradigm may much more efficaciously be defeated through a scientific 
demonstration of its groundlessness. As a matter of fact, the dominating confusion on method is 
grist to the mill of various dominant powers within society, the will and hope of people subjected to 
acute  paradigmatic  hegemonies  notwithstanding.  Many  times  humans  have  hoped  to  achieve 
redemption through the power of the normative; they have sometimes even believed to be building 
a paradise on earth, but have subsequently discovered that what they had built was rather hell on 
earth. The hope of earthly improvement does not depend solely on the will but requires also that 
will is aided by the teaching of science, primarily a social science that, unfortunately, does not yet  
exist. In sum, Mosini’s disdain for the positive view should take care to replace the positive not 
simply with the normative side but something expressing aspects that cannot be the object of the 
normative  action,  that  is,  what  we  call  ‘necessities’.  Mosini’s  disregard  for  those  necessities 
contradicts her insistence on the realism of assumptions and this contributes to the legitimization of 
the positive view.
A last digression on the question of  the ‘realistic assumptions’ may help our understanding of the 
vicissitudes of the Friedmanite teaching and the undue success of mainstream economics.  J.  M. 
Keynes focused upon an important realist assumption,  viz. the factors causing the deficiency of 
effective  demand.  Unfortunately,  he  ignored  some  other  important  realistic  assumptions.  In 
particular, he disregarded the fact that the strategic role of effective demand requires the satisfaction 
of two conditions: (a) that the economy is not afflicted by important structural lacks and dualisms so 
that the stimulus to demand draws forth the remaining variables; (b) the impossibility of endemic 
pressures from income distribution (that Keynes excluded through the hypothesis that the labour 
market determines money wages, not real wages, which latter should be a residual determined by 
price  movements).  When  conflicts  for  income  distribution  became  acute  and  frequent,  mainly 
propelled  by the  rise  of  the  contractual  force of  trade  unions,  economists  started  to  argue  that 
demand was in excess (instead of being insufficient); but in fact the operation of the old, and indeed 
the  central  realistic  assumption  of  J.M.  Keynes,  which  legitimated  demand  leadership,  was 
obstructed by the violations in de facto reality of those two further conditions, (a) and (b). Thus, the 
failure of the Keynesian paradigm has not been caused by ‘exogenous shocks’, but rather by its 
limitations. The cessation of the leading role of effective demand favored Friedman’s criticism and 
fuelled the well known conflict between Keynesians and monetarists, a conflict that expressed a real 
confusion due to basic errors in the interpretation of reality. Let us see.
   Monopolistic  capitalism,  characterized by high productivity  and low wages (and hence high 
profits, which were not fully reinvested due to the volatility of investments caused by the volatility 
of expectations and radical uncertainty), implied the situation that Keynes diagnosed, that is, one 
inclined towards the deficiency of effective demand. But the advent of conflictual-consumeristic 
capitalism, fostered by wage increases that the main industrial sectors offered to stimulate mass 
consumption, reversed the situation, thereby implying a radical change in the role of money. 
   Keynes’ theory of money and the interest rate was based on the notion of liquidity preference, 
implying that  increased money supply does not cause inflation but rather stimulates  production 
(through the reduction of the interest rate). Friedman’s teaching reaffirmed the quantity theory of 
money, according to which the money supply determines prices while the interest rate is determined 
by  real  factors.  Both  Keynesians  and  monetarists  were  wrong.  In  conflictual-consumeristic 
capitalism money had lost the exogenous-instrumental character that both Friedman and Keynes 
attribute  to  it.  The  money supply was endogenously determined  by acute  conflicts  for  income 
distribution operating both in the domestic market and (through high increases in oil prices) at the 
international  level.  In  conclusion,  in  conflictual-consumeristic  capitalism  inconvertible  money 
operated like don Circostanza (in Ignazio Silone’s well known 1933 book  Fontamara), a lawyer 
who proposed the attribution of three-quarters of the available water of a river to each one of the 
two opposing parts. The discovery by trade unions of don Circostanza’s trick directed their attention 
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toward real wages. Thereupon, the money supply ceased to stimulate production and accumulation, 
as  it  does  in  the  presence  of  monetary  illusion.  The  exigency  of  restrictive  money  policies 
commenced, thus giving rise to the so-called ‘stop-go’ phenomenon. Countries afflicted by wide 
sectoral and territorial disequilibria experienced an accentuation of the failure of both Keynesianism 
and Friedmanism. Income policy became a remedy practiced in the presence of acute crises. In 
order to return money to an instrumental role, a clear distinction between ‘necessity’ and ‘choice-
possibility’ is needed, as well as a clear awareness of the fact that income distribution pertains to the 
last.  
1.5 An allusion to the interpretation of social and historical processes  
A brief review of the historical-social process may help us to see better some of the mystifying 
implications of both the strong and the weak observational views, as well as the usefulness of the 
organizational  view  and  the  analytical  categories  specified  in  the  two  previous  sections.  It  is 
mistaken to think that the observation of historical events leads to well-founded interpretations of 
history. We know that the non-repetitiveness of those events prevents observation from discovering 
laws  of  motion  and that  the  observational  method  inclines  toward  determinism,  is  afflicted  by 
analytic  rigidity and imprisoned by what actually happened in the course of time.  In short,  the 
observational method cannot provide us with clear and profound answers to those queries that are 
provoked by the study of history. The past of a world characterized by growing innovations is liable 
to deceive us if we do not approach it with an organizational view. We must ask ourselves, then, if 
we want to really learn from the study of history, why certain things happened in a certain way,  
whether it might have been (objectively) possible for them to have unfolded in a different and better 
(in the sense of more profitable) way,  and what decisional and directional errors and interested 
mystifications occurred in the course of time.
We should be aware,  of course,  that the organizational  view in historical  studies raises some 
delicate problems and encounters some ancient prejudices. This happens because the employment 
of  this  view implies  the  use  of  the conditional  ‘if’,  which  is  vituperated,  derided and strongly 
condemned by the conventional wisdom – underlined by the most important historians – that history 
cannot be built upon a conditional. In effect, some solid methodological formulations are required 
for avoiding superficial and deceitful uses of ‘if’. Both the questions that the historian can and must 
ask of himself and the alternative hypotheses that he can and must formulate have to be based on 
objective foundations. But it is mistaken to presume that all that has happened was an inevitable 
necessity; such presumption imprisons scholars in the facts of the past. On the other hand, giving a 
free hand to fancy does not lead to scientific results but simply provides amusement in the form of 
easy and pleasant stories (just like a recent book on Romulus Augustulus that presents this last 
Roman emperor as the ancestor of the British King Arthur).
The  analysis  in  previous  sections  specifies  the  scientific  tools  capable  of  founding  historical 
studies on the hypothetic-organizational perspective. The distinction between necessity and choice-
possibility is  precious  from this point  of view. Let  us underline that  the gravitational  tendency 
toward organizational ‘necessities’, which is generated by processes of trial and error, the pains that 
are caused by this tendency and the failures that result as well as the consequent withdrawal from 
current processes probably accounts for the greater part of the trials and tribulations of history. 
Knowledge of those ‘necessities’ and hence of the errors and deviations that arise with respect to 
them,  in  addition  to  knowledge  of  the  causes  of  those  deviations  can  be  decisive  for  the 
understanding and interpretation of historical events. For its part, ‘choice-possibility’  legitimizes 
alternative hypotheses and choices about what has happened, and delineates their implications.25
An important analytical category concerning ‘necessity’ is represented by what in chapter 2 we 
shall  denominate  ‘functional  imperatives’,  i.e.  the  institutional  and  ethical-ideological  forms 
25 Many examples on this matter, framed on a planetary scale, may be found in: (A Fusari 2000)  
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required  for  reasons  of  organizational  efficiency  by  the  level  of  the  general  conditions  of 
development. We shall see that those imperatives allow a strict distinction between different phases 
or stages of historical development.
Another important analytical category is represented by what we shall denominate ‘ontological 
imperatives’; these largely determine the evolutionary strength of human societies and mark the 
distinction between closed and open societies. Finally, with reference to ‘choice-possibility’, a great 
importance must be attributed to ‘grand options’ or choices of civilization.
It  is  easy  to  see  the  usefulness  of  the  above analytical  categories  for  the  exploration  of  the 
evolutionary content, the erratic nature and other key attributes of historical-social processes. Very 
difficult and troublesome historic conjunctures occur when emerging functional imperatives start to  
contradict  well-rooted  aspects  of  civilizations  that  must,  therefore,  be  eliminated  if  these  
imperatives are to be fulfilled; and this is in spite of the fact that such elimination is opposed by  
customs,  habits  and  interests  strongly  embodied  in  the  existing  social  system. Well,  a  full 
consciousness of the required functional imperatives can significantly mitigate labor pains. We shall 
see in chapters 4 and 7 that it is illuminating to ask ourselves some ‘if’ questions. Such questions 
help us learn from what happened and may allow some useful forecast of what will happen, as the 
grand options expressed by civilizations and functional and ontological imperatives represent long-
lasting aspects of reality.
1.6   Conclusion
This chapter has sought to call the reader’s attention to some basic but questionable features of the 
standard methods of social and historical inquiry.  It has set out, as a preliminary,  some peculiar 
contents of social reality that carry profound implications for methodology. In particular, we have 
emphasized  the  importance  of  properly  combining  being  and  doing  in  the  context  of  an 
organizational view strictly rooted in reality. We have also noted the importance of distinguishing 
optional and creative aspects from structural necessities and arranging them appropriately. This has 
highlighted the limitations of both social naturalism and constructivism and traced the roots of the 
methodological confusion expressed chiefly in the widely held idea of the incommensurability of 
social knowledge. We have also sketched the way in which this confusion affects the interpretation 
of historical processes.
We have seen that,  on the one hand observational rationality ignores the fact that verification 
merely based on facts is not possible with reference to social reality, given its non-repetitive nature 
and, more generally, humanity’s ability to modify society. In this situation, the “falsification” of 
social theories is inevitable, which produces an impasse of observation based knowledge. Further, 
the observational  method concerns  being and not  doing, and this  makes  it  quite  unsuitable  for 
inquiry into social organization, particularly with regard to values, which represent a crucial part of 
social reality and organization. We have also seen that an opposite mistake afflicts constructivism, 
which  privileges  doing but  disregards  being.  On  the  other  hand,  an  anti-positivist  reaction, 
following Weber, has confirmed that the scientific investigation of values is impossible, and has 
plainly accepted the doctrine of incommensurability. We have underlined the importance, for the 
understanding  of  social  reality,  of  the  distinction  between  ‘necessity’  and  ‘choice-possibility-
creativeness’, and the way misunderstandings in this regard afflict important theoretical buildings, 
affect the conflict between normative and positive view and the interpretation of history.
A more stringent, systematic and detailed discussion on the method of the social sciences will be 
provided in the pages that follow.
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2 The core of the methodological question. Procedure, rules, 
classifications
  Introduction
This chapter points forcefully to the fundamental methodological problem facing the social sciences: 
drawing up analytical criteria capable of identifying general principles and sound, reliable knowledge 
despite  the rising flood of innovation within society. As discussed in chapter  1,  such a problem 
originates from the fact that, being social reality a product of human will and action, it cannot be 
investigated on the basis of the method of natural sciences, as social positivists do. The identification 
of general principles is obstructed to a remarkable degree by the dominant conflict between social 
scientists following rationalist constructivism and scholars who emphasize spontaneous behavior. The 
discussion of method that is developed below will show, purely on the basis of the crucial importance 
of spontaneous and non-intentional behaviors and also of the lack of knowledge, that these aspects are 
consistent with the unfolding of rational constructivism and, furthermore, that they imply and solicit it. 
This chapter may also be seen as a study of the explanatory power of the rationality principle for the 
analysis and organization of social systems. Such a power has been largely misunderstood by scholars, 
who have both taken it to excess, e.g. in the Enlightenment and by the majority of positivists, and by 
default, by irrationalists, historicists and a large part of sociologists. In general, studies on method 
insist  on  the  definition  of  the  procedures  and  rules  for  the  control  and  verification  of  theoretic 
formulations, while considering the achievement of the hypotheses on which those formulations hinge 
intractable from a methodological point of view, being the unfathomable result of some scientist’s 
particular genius. Popper is the main defender of this position, which may tend toward doctrines of 
incommensurability and a refusal to embrace scientific method. We shall see that social theory must 
reverse such a methodology and insist on the definition of some procedures and rules useful to the 
specification of initial hypotheses, and on their classification, which are decisive in the deriving of 
general principles; at the same time, social theory must develop a distrust of the usual procedures of 
control and verification, whether expressed in a falsificationist or in a positivist form.
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We have seen in  chapter  1  the importance  of  the distinction  between ‘necessity’  and ‘choice-
possibility’. The deepening, in this chapter, of our understanding of these two aspects will allow us to 
outline both a methodological arrangement of institutional analysis and, in particular, to prove that 
value premises are not always the object of choice and that they may sometimes admit of scientific 
explanation. This result opens the road to some important insights on ethical-ideological dimensions 
of social life. But there is much more. 
Section 1 sets out the main theoretical foundations of our proposal on method, while section 2 
illuminates  the  way to derive,  from such a  basis,  some general  principles  concerning the  social 
sciences; a derivation completely different from the attempted discovery of constants, such discovery 
search having no sense with regard to social reality. Section 3 moves from the general to the particular 
and is concerned with distinguishing particular aspects and choices having long duration, such as 
civilizations, from less involved choices; this section also stresses the role of innovation. From this 
basis, in sections 4 and 5 a synthesis of the procedure of social science as well as the role and meaning 
of function and conflict are traced. Section 6 then treats the puzzling question of prediction of social 
events, shows how it may be aided by our main analytical categories, and illuminates the relation 
between micro and macro theory. Finally, section 7 discusses the question of economic and social 
planning, a question that provides important lessons both from an empirical and methodological point 
of view. 
2.1  An alternative view on the confrontation with social reality: the priority of rules for the 
formulation of hypotheses versus those concerning the control of hypotheses; the rationality 
principle. Towards social objectivism  
We have seen that constructivist procedure is inappropriate to the study of social reality as it tends to 
ignore  or  undervalue  reality  to  the  advantage  of  doing.  We  have  also  seen  that  the  inductive 
experimental  method,  expressed by the stage H-Oc of  the procedure  currently designated  as  the 
scientific  method,  is  not  suitable  to  the  investigation  of  social  reality;  such  a  reality  must  be 
investigated through deductive methodologies. In effect economics has, for the most part, a deductive 
content  and  sociologists  like  Weber  and  Parsons  treated  the  method  of  social  sciences  from  a 
deductive point of view. Unfortunately,  the usual deductive approaches forget one or other of the 
following basic methodological requirement of social research:
First)  Deductions directed to the explanation of the functioning and organization of social systems 
cannot be based on conventional or nominalistic postulates, such as those underlying the formal-logic 
sciences; rather,  they must be derived from premises concerning aspects of de facto reality. As we 
shall see in the next section, such premises may be identified with much greater clarity than is the case 
with natural reality. 
Second) In social  science,  the rationality principle,  which leads to the formulation of theoretic 
interpretations, has a completely different content than mere observational rationality, which latter is 
distinctive to the natural sciences and implied by the long run Darwinian processes of selection. The 
rationality  principle  in  social  science must  also take  a  constructional  view so  as  to  include  the 
normative elements of the situation within the interpretative framework, as considered in section 2 of 
chapter 1. In short,  the rationality principle must be referred to the explicit pursuit of the rational  
organization of social systems. 
Third) The usual teaching on method neglects a main requirement of the method of social science: 
the definition of some classificatory procedure and, for each defined class, the further definition of  
some rules that facilitate the specification of initial postulates and ensure the profitableness of their  
subsequent use for analytical purposes.
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 Let us further clarify these points.
We have established that the method of social thought should be centered on the organizational 
view  (doing).  Moreover,  our  considerations  and  criticisms  of  the  role  of  observation  and 
abstraction imply that such a method can be neither strictly inductive nor ignore reality. It must be 
deductive, and it must derive its deductions from realistic postulates. The real and basic problem 
thus concerns the selection of postulates.26 In fact, the impossibility, due to the non-repetitiveness 
of  social  reality,  of  verifying  and corroborating,  with  the  help  of  econometrics  or  some other 
verification standard, the theories deducted negates the usefulness of a hypothetical generation of 
theories (a generation that Popper’s observational falsificationism assigns to chance). In sum, the 
impossibility  of verifying theories (via observation) points to a decisive role in warranting the  
reliability and fruitfulness of theories to two basic factors: theoretical deduction from realistic  
postulates;  the  definition  of  rules  concerning  the  formulation  and  classification  of  realistic  
postulates in order to replace the unreliable role at present pertaining (fot instance in economic  
modeling) to the econometric control of hypotheses. Those rules and procedure express the core of 
our proposal on method. 
     Some authors have envisaged the importance of selecting reliable and fecund postulates. H. 
Albert and J. Kapeller developments in the matter deserve attention. They refuse the apriorisms of 
‘model  Platonism’  and/or  the  search  of  expedients  to  escape  the  failures  of  observational-
experimental  standard (immunization  strategies),  through axiomatic  variations,  excessive  use of 
ceteris paribus, alibi assumptions in the form of unrealistic auxiliary hypotheses. Those authors 
insist on the realism of postulates, their informational content, etc. and, on this basis, set out some 
acute criticisms to neoclassical economics27. It is evident from above the insufficiency of the mere 
realism of postulates as assessed, for instance, by critical realism.
   We provide now some definitions, specification of rules and classification procedures intended 
to  guide  the  research  of  scholars  and,  in  particular,  the  corroboration  of  initial  postulates 
concerning the organization and functioning of social systems. This will allow us to move from 
generic  deductive  method  to  a  more  penetrating  deductive  approach  able  to  offer  general 
formulations relating to a continuously changing reality. Some applications of the definitions, rules 
and classification procedures introduced below will be provided in sections 3 and 4 of this chapter.
    At least four possible classifications of realistic postulates (together with implied deductive 
rules) can be set forth:
a. Postulates directed to the deduction of general principles demanded for pressing reasons of 
organizational efficiency; such principles will act as gravitational points, exerting strong attraction 
upon  social  processes.  These  postulates  must  express  very  significant  features  of  the  general  
conditions of development; they are, therefore, long-lasting, a product of the path of history, and 
they  exclude  specific  ideological,  technological  and  naturalistic  elements  and innovations.  We 
denominate the general organizational principles so deduced functional imperatives and we shall 
see in the next section that, as so defined, the term ‘functional imperative’ has a very different 
meaning from the term as used by T. Parsons (1987 and 1964).
b. Postulates expressing conditions of nature that have important institutional and organizational 
implications. These conditions are local and played a decisive role in characterizing the societies of 
the past (for instance desert, steppe, agricultural or seafaring peoples). Technological development 
has greatly reduced their influence (and hence the importance of the relative postulates), mainly 
through the increasing role of artifacts and the tremendous speed of communications. However, the 
26 Long  lasting  discussions  and  controversies  on  axioms  and  postulates  have  agitated  logical-formal  sciences 
notwithstanding these sciences need, by their nature, a very limited number of postulates. The situation with regard to  
postulates is much more complicated when deductive procedure is applied in the social sciences; nevertheless, these 
sciences have dedicated little attention to the question of postulates. 
27 See H. Albert (2012[1963]) and 1993: J. Kapeller (2013)
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conditions of nature underline the important role that scarcity has played from the first appearance 
of human beings on the Earth. The importance of scarcity traverses the whole history of the world 
and has always obliged humanity to work bravely and to realize its potential genius. Scarcity gives 
rise to the man as builder and as organizer, while the binary scarcity-curiosity generates the man 
explorer.  Also  basic  technologies  (i.e.  indispensable  to  make  possible  the  existing  level  of 
development) can be included in this category.
c. Two postulates concerning respectively the unfolding of human evolutionary potentialities, (i.e. 
of the natural human ability to develop) and social cohesion. The two postulates are strictly linked 
to  each  other  social  cohesion  being  an  important  condition  for  the  expression  of  human 
evolutionary  potentialities,  and  are  both  deeply  rooted  in  basic  aspects  of  human  nature.  We 
denominate their implications ‘ontological imperatives’, which express the true engine of social  
development.  These imperatives have a very general character, more general and more enduring 
than functional imperatives of point (a); but many of them can be violated over very long periods 
of time (and often have been in the so-called closed societies) since their violation does not affect 
organizational coherence and, indeed, can even enforce it. It may be useful to make a distinction 
relating  to  two  very  important  aspects  of  this  postulate  sub  c  about  human  evolutionary 
capabilities.
c’.  ‘Human rational skills’: an excess of the rational drive with respect to the creative drive may 
promote social organization and admirable developments (as B. De Finetti points out).
c”. ‘Human creative skills’: an excess of the creative drive with respect to the rational drive may 
cause social disintegration. 
d.  Postulates concerning ideological aspects, choices and creative events. The organizational and 
institutional forms deriving from these postulates define the field of ‘choice-possibility-creativity’.  
They do not pertain, therefore, to the field of ‘necessity’, even if the most important of them, i.e. 
the choices of  civilization,  are characterized by long duration and pervasiveness. This makes it 
clear that the usual identification of durability with ‘necessity’ is erroneous.
The realistic postulates (a) and (b) together with their implications give the field of ‘necessity’ in  
the organization of social systems (but, of course, not with regard to individual decisions, where 
what is necessity under some circumstances may be choice under others).  In the modern age of  
dynamic society, postulate sub c on evolutionary potentialities with its implications must be added  
as a component of the field of ‘necessity’.
The  rules  above  illustrate  the  methodological  «separation»  between  ‘necessity’  and  ‘choice-
possibility-creativity’  in  the  social  sciences,  as  well  as  its  importance.  Thus  we  arrive  at  the 
methodological succession and procedure CRP-TD (classification of realistic postulates-theoretical 
deductions)  in  place  of  O-H-Oc (observation-hypotheses-control  observation)  typical  of  the 
observational inductive and deductive methods, or the H-Oc typical of the Popperian hypothesis-
falsification. 
   Our summary rules seem to  add a  more  general  and stringent  treatment  on the question of 
postulates and their  specification to the one by Albert  and Kapeller.  However, those rules alone 
cannot guarantee appropriate selection of postulates. The fruitfulness of the selection depends also on 
the scholar’s own intellect and sense of reality, and needs careful control. 
    In short, our method’s relationship with reality basically concerns the search for fecund realistic 
initial postulates, not ex post verification of theories (the very nature of social reality makes such 
verification  meaningless).  All  the deductive  methods  that  are  used in  social  thought  ignore the 
classifications  we  propose  and  so  fall  into  a  generic  deductivism,  or  Popper’s  hypothesis-
falsification  deductivism.  For  their  part,  those  deductions  that  follow  the  abstract  rationality 
standard forget reality. So the methodology we suggest begins with the classification and selection  
of ‘realistic’ postulates, and then proceeds to deduce their implications for the organization of social 
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systems. Such a procedure implies the combination of being (realistic postulates) and doing (the  
organization of society). Let us remember that, unlike observational rationality, which is based on 
the acceptance  of existing conditions  (with  the underlying  idea that  the real  is  rational)  and is 
typical  of  positivist  and  evolutionary  thought,  prescriptive  and  organizational  rationality  is 
appropriate to a reality that is constructed by humanity. 
To summarize, the method of social sciences must be  deductive and must derive deductions from 
realistic postulates on the basis of the principle of  organizational rationality. Moreover, it must be 
centered on the specification of rules and procedure of classification that lead scholars in their research 
into and corroboration of significant initial postulates, thus supplying some efficient tools to deductive 
analysis  to  replace  the  term H-Oc,  i.e.  warranting  the  solidity  of  deductions  notwithstanding  the  
absence of an empirical verification of the theory.28 So the proposed method, while suggesting a need 
to concentrate on the definition of procedures and rules suitable to facilitate the specification of initial 
hypotheses, which in social reality may be much more accurately defined than in natural reality, at the 
same time refuses the observational search for falsifying (or confirming) events, since social change 
causes a substantial  evaporation of the usefulness of falsificationism as well  as of other kinds of 
observation. In some sense, then, the falsification (observational) procedure might only be referred to 
initial postulates, i.e. the first term (O-H) of the succession O-H-Oc. In sum, the method we propose, 
instead of being based on the criterion of observational verification of theories, implying that reality 
means necessity, is based on the analysis of plausibility,  efficiency and realism of postulates.  This 
implies that an important factor in the evolution of social science is represented by changes over time  
in the degree of plausibility and effectiveness of postulates. Therefore, the method we propose differs 
from  all  deductive  methods:  the  Popperian  one;  the  method  based  on  the  principle  of  abstract 
rationality; and the deduction method based on mere observation, i.e. abstracting from the rules and 
classifications specified above. The nature of the difference will be further explored in the next section, 
devoted to the derivation of general principles.
2.2 The formulation of general principles in the social sciences. 
2.2.1 The notion of functional imperative and the methodological centrality of institutional analysis.
We have noted above that  the observer  of social  reality  sees an effervescent  world,  replete  with 
contradictions  and changes  that  make  orientation  difficult.  The  overcoming  of  this  disorientation 
requires an answer to the following questions: toward what long run order does the auto selective 
process that converts disorder into order, through often extremely painful trial and error, push the 
system? Which existing  situations  best  approach such an adventurous tendency,  and how best to 
accelerate the convergence of spontaneous behavior toward it? More precisely, the overcoming of this 
disorientation needs a method that allows for the articulation of the gravitational attractions and other 
stabilizing  forces  or,  in  other  words,  derives  some  solid  and  reliable  generalizations  that  act  as 
fundamental  explanatory and leading principles.  As just  seen,  the satisfaction  of this  requirement 
requires some appropriate classifications,  as well  as some methodological rules that help to select 
realistic postulates29 in the unfolding of the process of the deduction of general principles.
28     C.S. Peirce underlined the sterility of induction as a supposed seed of creativity, as well as the conservative inclination 
of logical deduction. He added, therefore, a third category to induction and deduction that he termed "abduction", which 
concerned creative formulation of explanatory hypotheses. But this new category has not generated any elaboration on 
method that facilitates creativity in formulating theoretical hypotheses. The role that Peirce attributes to metaphor in this 
regard must be considered with great caution; in fact, and as pointed out above, methods elaborated by other sciences are 
completely inappropriate to social research. 
29     Note that structural change due to creativity impedes the use of conventional modeling and stability analysis, i.e.  
analysis based on a precise quantitative structure from which are derived eigenvectors and which allow the development of 
quali-quantitative analyses of the effects of changes in parameters.
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Not everything is free to change. In every society, the forces of continuity and necessity flank those 
of  change.  As  we  know,  it  is  crucial  to  distinguish  the  elements  expressing  choice  from those 
expressing necessity. Change is due to innovations. We shall see later the way in which innovations 
enter into modeling and explanatory analyses. Here we must concentrate on permanence, the factors of 
duration that  allow the derivation of general  principles,  the skeleton of scientific  knowledge,  and 
bench-marks of theoretic modeling, that unable the scientist to find his bearings within the vortexes of 
changeable social reality.  This section will discuss the method of deriving such general principles. 
Clearly, these general principles must concern necessity, not choice, as choice generates particular; 
besides, our principles must concern long duration. We are going to outline a notion satisfying those 
requisites,  in  particular,  embodying  both  the  aspects  of  permanence  and  necessity.  We  shall 
denominate this notion functional imperative, following T. Parsons’ terminology30.
As is  well  known, Parsons listed some imperatives  valid  over time and space that  the social 
system must satisfy in order to preserve interior equilibrium and its own existence. Unfortunately, 
the fact that Parsons' notion of functional imperative aspires to express historical constants gives the 
analysis  a  stationary  imprint.  In  particular,  Parsons'  insistence  on  his  functional  imperative 
concerning  the  preservation  of  the  value  premises  mixes  necessity,  duration  and  choice,  thus 
causing a total confusion of those elements and thereby severely obstructing the progress of social 
theory.  In  effect,  Parsons’  functional  imperatives  express,  more  properly,  merely  functional  
exigencies.  Moreover, Parsons proposes a treatment of the ethical-ideological aspect focusing upon 
the  functional  side,  while  almost  completely  neglecting  the  optional-innovative  and  conflictual 
sides, which are crucial for social change.  But value premises mainly express choice, even when 
they involve long duration. The notion of functional imperative, if it is to possess all its potential 
explanatory  power,  must  be  emancipated  from such limitations  as  well  as  from any confusion 
between necessity and choice. In particular, it is important to distinguish this notion from that of 
civilization (see next section), which, by contrast, is completely embodied within Parsons' concept 
of functional imperative. It is urgent to enunciate a definition and some rule for the derivation of the 
functional imperative immunizing it from these ambiguities. 
The functional imperative must express an organizational order or principle imposed by mere reasons 
of systemic efficiency, it expresses necessary conditions of efficiency; in sum,  it must refer to pure  
organizational rationality. As such, it concerns the element of necessity, not of choice; in particular, it  
must not embody ethical-ideological  ’options’ irrespective of their  possible  great importance and  
solidity. It  is  also  useful  to  underline  that  the  functional  imperative  cannot  be  directed  to  the 
designation of some historical constants as these can be referred only to stationary societies; rather, it  
must express some dynamic entities that are variable over the very long run. A primary task for social 
theory is thus the definition of some rules that allow for the discovery of organizational categories 
fulfilling the above requisites. Let us attempt this task with more detail than hitherto.
Clearly, the greatest adversity with which the social sciences must contend in their effort to generate 
enduring principles, possibly valid over a wide geographical range, is the process of ideological and 
technological selection and revision – in a word, innovation. To deduce such principles, then, one must 
generalize  with  respect  to  innovative  phenomena.31 More  specifically,  the  deduction  of  general 
principles for the social sciences must begin from premises that concern the general aspects of the 
social reality considered, which descend from its general conditions of development; it must not begin 
from premises (postulates) that themselves include specific ideological or technological conditions and 
choices, or specific aspects of nature, however important and decisive (and even if extremely long-
lasting), because these are particular, optional aspects.
A useful rule for the derivation of functional imperatives may consist in concentrating on the existing  
general  conditions  of  development,  in  order  to  extract  from  them  some  extremely  general  and  
meaningful aspects, which will then act as postulates from which to derive all implications for the  
30 See T. Parsons (1987 and 1964)
31    Of course, abstracting also from the particular conditions of nature.
45
efficient  organization  of  social  systems, in  the  form  of  functional  imperatives. Of  course,  the 
imperatives derived in such a way vary with the general conditions of development, thus providing a 
basic expression of the dynamics of society. In sum, these organizational categories emerge over the 
course of history, as the product of the sedimentation of successive innovations, moral or ideological 
value judgments  and technological  choices (as opposed to specific  choices and innovations).  The 
realistic premises (postulates) from which these categories are derived are extracted from the previous 
sedimentation, making these organizational entities relatively steady points of reference demarcating 
continually  changing  social  reality;  they  embody  the  aspect  of  duration.  Clearly,  these  initial 
hypotheses derived by the general conditions of development are not some mere conjectures in the 
sense  of  Popper;  they  represent  some  clear  and  well  corroborated  premises,  supplying  solid 
foundations to deductive procedure. 
As  the  product  of  a  rationality  that  is  not  conditioned  by specific  technological  or  ideological 
assumptions but only by the general configuration of the situation, functional imperatives will reflect 
functional  needs  that  are  not  linked  to  the  pursuit  of  specific  objectives  and  particular  choices. 
Rationally speaking, the substance of these general principles is simply not a matter of choice. Ignoring 
them means adopting quite illogical and irrational courses of action and solutions, that is, entailing 
costs with no offsetting benefits, in that such actions are neither imposed by nor connected with a 
choice  of  aims.  It  follows  that  these  general  principles  constitute  some  necessary  conditions  of  
efficiency. They are relevant to all situations characterized by similar levels of development, and their 
degree of generality obviously depends on the degree of generality of the postulates from which they 
are derived. The theoretical relevance of our notion of  functional imperative mainly depends on the 
fact that it embodies both the aspect of necessity and permanence.
The  above  functional  imperatives  are  eminently  concerned  with  institutional  order.  They  may 
contribute  greatly  to  the  methodological  systematization  of  social  theory and to  remedying  some 
misunderstandings characterizing the debate on institutions that confines this debate to a marginal 
position  with  respect  to  the  great  theoretical  tradition.  In  particular,  the  concept  of  functional 
imperative  may  provide  a  stronger  methodological  base  and  legitimacy  to  institutional  and  neo-
institutional analysis, as well as many formulations of economics distinguished by their closeness to 
reality.32 These imperatives represent the pillars of social systems and point to the great necessities that 
these imperatives must uphold. People must clearly see them in order to build the new functional 
imperatives imposed by changes in the general conditions of development. 
It  may  be  useful  to  confirm that,  according  to  our  methodological  proposal,  observation  must 
concern only initial propositions and postulates (as derived, for instance, from the general conditions of 
development), but not the verification of theoretical formulations. In other words, the term O of the 
procedure O-H-Oc operates only initially, not in the final stage devoted to the control of theory. In fact, 
reality may differ widely from functional imperatives, which latter only represent some gravitational 
attractions of the auto selective process of trial and error. There is no guaranty that they will be present 
in reality and thus constitute a possible object of experimental verification; indeed, very often they are 
not reflected by reality. It is a task of theory to enunciate their functional role, properties, the necessity 
of building them and the way to do so. The verification of general theories (i.e. characterized by high 
permanence)  may  cautiously  be  based  on  observation,  but  only  in  the  special  case  that  social 
organization  satisfies  (i.e.  embodies)  the  functional  imperatives  pertaining  to  the  considered 
development phase with its general conditions. 
The  above  treatment  allows  us  to  understand  that  social  research  currently  uses  a  deductive 
procedure more insidious than the abstract deductive method. This particularly problematic deductive 
procedure is represented by observational deductivism, which does not follow the rule of derivation of 
32     For instance, and as we shall see in the paragraph on exemplification, Kirzner's analysis of economic process implicitly 
specifies (and is hinged on) some basic functional imperatives of modern dynamic economies (the entrepreneur, market 
process, decentralization of decision making). Again, Williamson's analysis centered on transaction costs, as well as the 
economic analysis of rights (EAR), are substantially aimed at pointing out that the firm’s organization and some rights  
represent functional imperatives. 
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functional imperatives expressed above, but rather pretends to derive general principles from postulates 
that include particular ideological aspects; in this way, this procedure mixes indistinctly necessity and 
choice,  ignoring  the  optional-creative  aspect  on  the  assumption  that  reality  means  necessity. 
Economics, which is the most advanced branch of social theory, contains numerous examples not only 
of the abstract deductive method (mainly represented by models of general equilibrium) but, even 
more, of observational deductivism (as represented by, for example, the opposite Smith's and Marx's 
appreciations on the market and the entrepreneur, which consider these synonymous with the capitalist 
market  on  the  basis  of  an  historical  observation  that  shows  these  organizational  forms  strictly 
embodied in a specific kind of civilization, the capitalistic one, and on the associated value premises). 
2.2.2 The commensurability of social knowledge, ethical relativism and natural rights; the scientific  
derivation of some value premises and the notion of ontological imperative.
1.  The above notion of functional imperative entails some basic results concerning the crucial issue of 
value premises and the cumulativeness of social knowledge. We saw before that an important rule for 
the derivation of these imperatives is the exclusion from postulates of particular technological and 
ethical-ideological aspects, as these are objects of choice. The exclusion from postulates of specific 
ideological aspects denies the Weberian assumption that the building of theory cannot abstract from 
value  premises  and,  therefore,  this  avoids  the  incommensurability  (i.e.  non comparability)  of  the 
theoretical  principle  (functional  imperative)   in  question. The  rationality  principle  and  the 
comparability  of  social  theories  receive  another  important  support  from  the  fact  that  functional 
imperatives may also concern some basic values with which the system of values as a whole must 
cohere (we considered this already in speaking of ‘necessity’ and we shall further clarify this important 
point  later  through  some  examples).  This  circumstance  has  another  important  consequence.  The 
statement that some ethical aspects may represent (be derived as) functional imperatives and therefore 
express  necessity,  implies  a  scientific  limitation  (in  addition  to  limitations  of  a  religious  and 
metaphysical type) to cultural relativism: the scientific, i.e. objective character of some value premises 
proves the groundlessness of the equal rank that cultural relativism attributes, in principle, to all such 
premises. The current failure to grasp this crucial point concerning value premises generates numerous, 
profound and well  rooted misunderstandings  in social  theory,  most  notably an extremely harmful 
confusion between the elements of necessity and choice, impeding the building of a scientific theory of 
social and historical development.
In other words, the notion of functional imperative considerably reduces the indeterminacies and 
strong contrasts fueled by the idea of the inescapable pervasiveness and equal dignity of different 
"points of view". This result amplifies remarkably the role of scientific analysis in the field of social 
phenomena and, in particular, the cumulativeness of scientific knowledge.33 But it may be useful to 
underline, in this regard, that Parsons' approach, which emphasizes, as we have just seen, the duration 
of  values  and  their  functional  role,  forgets  that  the  value  premises  not  constituting  functional 
imperatives are object of choice, i.e. are characterized by a scientific ambiguity. Some contemporary 
scholars insist upon the possibility of scientific investigation of impersonal, objective, social values 
that are shared by a large number of people, as distinct from strictly personal, subjective, individual 
values that cannot be the object of science. We think our notion of functional imperatives goes beyond 
such assertions and clarifies some of their limitations. The scientific nature of functional imperatives is 
unquestionable,  even when they concern value premises, independently on their degree of sharing 
among people. Weber's denial of the possibility for science to investigate ethical aspects of phenomena 
is exaggerated, while Parsons' position on the matter seems too extensive as social values do not escape 
33   The results presented in this and the previous paragraph may provide a substantial contribution to the solution of the 
“post  positivist  puzzle of  relativism” and the incommensurability problem, pointed out by M. Ardebili  (2003).  R. 
Bhaskar’s solution here is not exhaustive since it  eludes the ontology of science, i.e. “the scientists’ conception of  
reality”. 
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– in principle and in contrast to Parsons’ imperatives – options and creativity, and, hence, some sort of 
scientific ambiguity (except in the case that they represent functional imperatives in our sense). 
The scientific derivation of values based on the notion of functional imperative does not deny the 
historical nature of social events and it does not need metaphysical supports, as does the doctrine of 
natural rights. In some sense our notion of functional imperative lies between historicism and jus 
naturalism. The theoretical principles that this notion allows us to formulate, being derived from the 
general  conditions  of  development  concerning  the  investigated  society,  represent  a  result  of 
historical processes. But these principles share with the theory of natural rights a derivation based 
on the rationality principle and a non-relativistic content. They express an inevitable need for social  
organizations belonging to the same phase of development.  Functional imperatives do not depend 
on some specific civilization but, rather, and as we shall see, influence such civilization as this must 
be congenial to them. They express all that science may say on ethics that, for the remainder, admits 
only criteria of justification based on faith. We shall see in chapter 8 that these imperatives may 
offer a basis for a contractualist notion of right immune to the criticism formulated by juridical 
positivism, and provide a foundation upon which to build a theory of right hinged on a science of 
social institutions and organizations. 
2. The notion of ‘ontological imperative’ concerning, as we saw, the unfolding of human evolutionary 
potential, provides another important support to the scientific derivation of ethical values. This notion 
expresses  some  general  and  basic  characteristics  of  human  beings.  In  contrast  to  functional 
imperatives, ontological imperatives do not vary with the general conditions of development and hence 
are not pushed to impress themselves upon it over the course of history but, rather, remain valid for 
ever. They may be repressed, however, for unlimited periods of time if a particular social order is 
characterized by a civilization adverse to them. Their triumph is warranted only if the evolutionary 
process is not obstructed, so that they are transformed, sooner or later, into functional imperatives; at 
that point, the past insistence upon them by some scholar, wise man or religious seer will appear 
retrospectively as a sort of prophecy. One particularly important ontological imperative is the tolerance 
principle.  This  is  a  consequence  of  the  limitations  and  the  intensive  differentiation  of  human 
knowledge, which both imply that nobody has a complete monopoly upon reason and that human 
beings may profitably use reason only if they accept (and look for) confrontation with different and 
dissident points of view; in fact, knowledge proceeds by trial and error and heterodox propositions may 
indicate some fruitful solutions to the problems of daily life. Another important ontological imperative 
concerns the role of the individual. The fact that the individual is the first source of both creativity and 
of the dynamics and variety of social processes implies the (ontological) importance of individual 
action and dignity and of the principle of personal responsibility as indispensable in warranting the 
social profitableness of that action.
The presence or absence (i.e. by violation) of ontological imperatives is a distinguishing mark of, 
respectively, open and closed societies. As we shall soon see, with the advent of the stage of modern 
dynamic societies some important ontological imperatives also become functional imperatives, for they 
are indispensable to the preservation of social dynamism  
2.2.3 Some examples.
The five chapters in Part II of this book will consider a wide number of ontological and functional 
imperatives with reference to the most important fields of social sciences. However, it is indispensable 
to provide soon some examples of those imperatives, aimed at reducing the abstractness of the analysis 
and improving understanding. It may be useful to start from some further examples of  ontological  
imperatives.
An  important  ontological  imperative  is  represented  by  the  division  of  labor.  In  fact,  such  a 
division is an immediate consequence of the great variety of individual capabilities and hence a 
main organizational tool allowing for the expression of human potentialities. An important feature 
48
of this ontological imperative is its achievement, from early primitive societies onwards, also of the 
role of functional imperative, i.e. a principle strictly indispensable to the organizational efficiency 
of society. Of course, it is of the utmost importance to manage labor division in such a way that 
individuals’ work corresponds to their natural skills, professional work being an important means of 
expression of human evolutionary potential.
The principle of reciprocity and the sense of fraternity, underlined by C. Lubich and S. Zamagni,  
are  important  ontological  imperatives  deriving  from  the  postulate  sub  c  representing  social 
cohesion.  Other  ontological  imperatives  flanking  the  autonomy,  dignity  and  sacredness  of  the 
principles of individuality and tolerance, are distributive justice and the practice of power as service 
instead of domination,  i.e. according to well defined responsibilities that avoid abuse and ‘free’ 
judgment in the practice of power. In fact,  the evolutionary potential  of humanity springs from 
creative processes that,  in order for them to happen, need the respect  that flows from personal 
dignity and hence the elimination as much as possible of abuses of power and injustice. Moreover, 
the efflorescence of creativity and knowledge needs free confrontation between ideas, achievements 
and points of view, for human beings, possessed as they are of limited intellective skills, require 
pluralism and tolerance. The degree of self propulsion of any one particular civilization depends on 
the manner and extent to which it incorporates the above ontological imperatives.
We come now to some example of functional imperatives. Let us refer, at first, to social systems 
characterized by advanced general conditions of development. These societies are obliged to satisfy 
the postulate concerning the unfolding of the human evolutionary potentialities at the base of the 
notion of ontological imperative.  Therefore, they give expression of the transformation of some 
ontological  imperatives  into functional  imperatives.  In particular,  we may deduce that  the high 
degree of dynamism of these societies needs the work of innovators and, more generally, a social 
organization satisfying the following criteria: that it is open to criticism and to full appreciation of 
individual initiative and skill, it is able to deal with the high uncertainty caused by non-stationary 
change, that it is therefore agile, versatile, well-informed and quick to perceive and anticipate the 
changes in progress. Therefore, and as we saw, we deduce the need for a decentralized organization, 
for  the  entrepreneur,  the  market  and  exchange  value  as  necessary  tools  of  information  and 
coordination in the presence of high uncertainty, and of profit, as an indispensable measure of the 
efficiency of entrepreneurial action and decision making. These fundamental economic categories 
appear to be tightly connected to modern dynamic society,  being indispensable requisites of its 
organizational efficiency and the source of its dynamism; therefore, they are functional imperatives  
of these societies. 
The  above  deductions  tell  us  that  some  important  value  premises connected  to  institutional 
decentralization  –  such  as  pluralism,  the  acceptance  of  deviants  and  of  criticism  and  the  full 
appreciation of individual initiative – constitute (as with decentralization) objective necessities for the 
existence and efficiency of modern dynamic societies, i.e. constitute functional imperatives. We can 
see,  therefore,  that  some  ontological  imperatives  considered  above  become,  in  modern  dynamic 
societies, functional imperatives. This makes evident an important law of social development: with the  
variation and advancement of the general condition of development, propelled by the presence of a  
civilization that incorporates important ontological imperatives, these latter become also (in modern  
dynamic societies)  functional imperatives, that is, the satisfaction of these ontological imperatives  
becomes an organizational ’necessity’ of the resulting societies. The violation, in a social organization 
that  has  reached  this  stage  of  development,  of  the  above  imperatives,  generates  weighty 
inconsistencies. Such a society must hurry to satisfy them, thus bringing itself in syntony with historic 
development; otherwise it will be destroyed by its internal contradictions and the competition with 
rival systems satisfying those imperatives.
Functional imperatives represent, as we saw, great gravitational centers exerting strong attractive 
force upon the spontaneous processes of trial and error; therefore, they cannot be eluded. It is important 
to consider this point with attention in order to accurately edify them, avoiding such edification is 
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obstructed and delayed by misunderstandings, prejudices and the particular interests of dominating 
powers. One may give many examples across history of these basic organizational categories of society 
expressing  historical  necessity.  So,  those  who  study  primitive  societies  see  the  relative  familial 
organization at their  centre.  Such an organization clearly constitutes a functional  imperative,  after 
depuration  of  the  various  and  sometimes  eccentric  ideological  forms  associated  with  family 
relationship in various cases. Levi-Strauss' analyses of the form of family relatives have clarified this 
aspect well.
The multiplication of functions and social differentiation, the development of transportation, of the 
size of territorial groups, of exchange, wealth and conflicts determine the need for a more sophisticated 
social organization. In particular, such multiplications and developments compel the birth of a more 
impersonal power than that embodied in the relative organization, endowed with a higher compulsory 
force: the command power. This new functional imperative, which first made its appearance through 
the phenomenon of companion-in-arms and other similar aggregations, later took the substance of state 
power that assumed various forms over the course of the development process; some expressions of 
them are imperial state, national state, and various forms of the centralization of political power.
The acquisition of a central position in the social process by the economy has some new functional 
imperatives pushed onto the scene. Economies characterized by small operational unities and markets 
regulated by demand and supply need very different institutions than do economies dominated by 
market power. For instance, in the latter case the functional imperative of the control of aggregate 
demand arises as a counterpart to the deficiency of effective demand. Economies passing through the 
takeoff phase need institutions and strategies suitable to combat the underdevelopment trap, while 
dualistic economies require structures capable of avoiding the trap of dualism.
The historical phase that we are now passing through imposes new functional imperatives that merit 
an accurate investigation. The rapid increase of international exchange and the advent of the global 
economy require new economic institutions. More generally, the planetary breadth of modern societies 
determines an increasing need for supranational compulsory powers34 that, together with the need for 
decentralization expressed above, favors federalism over the national state; moreover, a penetrating 
operation of reciprocity is needed in order to warrant social cohesion, as underlined by S. Zamagni.
The entry of the masses onto the scene of contemporary society determines an increasing need for 
institutions  capable  of  conjugating  operational  efficiency  and  social  justice,  for  instance:  the 
‘separation’ of the firm from the conflict for income distribution thereby making the market a pure 
mechanism for efficiency and accountancy, the rationalization and redefinition of welfare state, the 
definition of indicators of efficiency concerning activities characterized by market failure.35  
Basic  technologies,  i.e.  technologies  that  are  fundamental  to  the  existence  of  the  general 
conditions  of  development,  and  the  organizational  forms  that  they  imply,  are  also  functional 
imperatives.
It  is  important  to underline that  the specification  of ontological  and functional  imperatives  is 
based  on  our  notion  of  organizational  rationality;  they  are  inconsistent  with  other  notions  of 
rationality, previously criticized. A reference to S. Zamagni’s development of this matter may allow 
some further clarification. Zamagni opposes Ulysses’  instrumental rationality, exemplified by the 
command of this mythological Homeric hero that he be fastened to the mainmast so that he might 
listen to the song of the Sirens without being drawn to wreck his ship, to Jason’s relational rationality, 
i.e. Orpheus’ use of extraordinary lyrical and musical skills to allow the Argonauts to freely listen to 
the song of the Sirens without risking a shipwreck. Zamagni underlines that the virtues of relational 
rationality  are:  to  conjugate  efficiency and freedom,  to  allow the possibility  of  combination  with 
different values, to not separate the head from the heart. This is wonderful, but it illustrates some 
scientific ambiguity. The heart is an ambiguous advisor; it is important to avoid it operating against the 
head, and this end requires some objective specification concerning both ethical values and the relation 
34 Such powers might be substituted by forms of imperialism; but these are strongly opposed by the conscience of modern 
Man.
35 See (H. Ecksted and A. Fusari 2010), chapter 8.
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between efficiency and freedom. Our notion of organizational rationality has a much wider extension 
than  instrumental  rationality,  in  particular  regarding important  values  that  we proved to  have  an 
objective  substance  (in  the  form  of  ontological  and  functional  imperatives),  e.g.  the  values  of 
reciprocity and fraternity (which Zamagni underlines) as deriving from postulate c regarding social 
cohesion;  moreover,  our  distinction  between necessity  and choice-possibility  provides  a  scientific 
conjugation of efficiency and freedom. These extensions avoid the possible ambiguities of relational 
rationality. Unfortunately, instrumental rationality is often considered the most genuine expression of 
scientific  thought.  This  widespread  conviction  is  helped  by  the  above  mentioned  ambiguity  of 
relational rationality.
We hope that we have satisfactorily developed, in this section, the aspect of ‘necessity’. We shall 
concentrate now on the aspect of specificity and choice that evokes conflict. 
2.3   From general to particular:  continuity and permanence versus change.  
Functional and ontological imperatives constitute, so to speak, the skeleton of social knowledge. Of 
course, theoretical research can hardly be content with such a high level of generalization, relevant to 
any number of different social systems. Theory requires more highly developed articulation if it is to 
be suited  for  more  circumstantial  analysis.  The emergence  of value-ideological  and technological 
choices, innovations and specific natural conditions, together with their implications, are of decisive 
importance in characterizing individual social systems. It is here that we identify what forges and 
shapes  societies.  Thus,  general  principles  need  to  be  complemented  by  theoretical  formulations 
concerning these particulars.36 Note that the ‘particulars’ considered here generate some clearer initial 
hypotheses,  even  if  they  be  more  changeable  than  those  suggested  by the  general  conditions  of 
development.
In contrast to the analysis  of the preceding section, which concerned the aspect of permanence-
necessity, this section is mainly devoted to the aspect of choice and social change. But there are some 
choices that remain unvaried for a very long time. It may be useful to analyze them first of all, with the 
primary purpose of deepening our understanding of the distinction between necessity and duration. 
The conditions of nature express an important and long lasting element of reality;  but they vary 
widely across geographical areas, thus representing the particular side of theory. This is quite obvious. 
But it may be useful to insist on the relation between duration and value choices; this will illustrate 
with lucidity the difference between the notions of duration and necessity, as the first may also concern 
value choices. Besides, such analysis will lead us, in addition to functional and ontological imperatives, 
also  to  enunciate  another  important  pillar  of  the  interpretation  of  social  process:  the  concept  of 
civilization.
2.3.1 Grand options and civilizations; their relations with functional imperatives. About the concept of  
utopia
That which is the result of choice does not always imply change and temporariness. One important  
exception is given by the basic ideological choices around which the entire social fabric revolves, is 
structured and is integrated. Such exceptions may be defined as  grand options. The following are 
examples of grand options: the idea of progress typical of Western societies, worship of the autocrat 
and  of  the  state,  the  spirit  of  conformity  and  the  culture  of  obedience  typical  of  bureaucratic  
centralized systems. These key ideas define the fundamental physiognomy of the social system; they 
are its supreme, guiding criterion, the inner fire that warms its hearth. They are the product of very 
long lasting elaborations  and cannot  be overturned by sharp,  sudden decisions but  can only be 
removed gradually over a protracted period of transition; for their removal implies the dismantling 
36 For instance, a desert people and a seafaring people will be induced by their differing environmental circumstances to  
construct dissimilar institutions and social orders. Institutional and organizational dissimilarities will also mark the social 
systems of peoples with – for example – different religious beliefs and/or different technological conditions.
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of an entire and relatively cohesive set of concepts, behaviors, ideals, institutions, and so on. In a 
word,  the  removal  of  grand  options implies  the  waning  of  the  old  social  universe  and  the 
construction of a new one.  Such  grand options constitute an important factor of continuity.  Their 
extensive persistence over time and/or their derivation from protracted sedimentation and synthesis 
assimilates them to the postulates from which functional imperatives are derived. But they differ from 
the latter (concerning necessity) in that they imply specific value-ideological choices. There can be no 
doubt but that they represent elements crucial for systems modeling. There exists a correspondence 
between  the  concept  of  grand  option  and  that  of  civilization.  We  define  a  civilization  as  an 
institutionalized set of value-ideological and technological choices, together with the organizational  
forms consequent to those choices and to the conditioning of the natural environment, marked by the  
grand options. This concept of civilization differs from that of society and that of ‘social system’ in 
that it excludes: those ideological and technological choices and innovations not yet institutionalised, 
functional imperatives plus basic technologies (in that these categories characterize all societies at a 
given level of development, whatever their form of civilization)37. We shall se in chapter 4 that the 
concept of civilization plays a central role in the construction of a theory of social development and the 
historical  process,  in  interaction  with  functional  and  ontological  imperatives  and  with  non-
institutionalized innovations and choices.
There exists  an opposition between the concepts of civilization and functional  imperative.  Both 
concepts refer to the long run, but the first concerns choice, while the second refers to the formulation 
of general principles and necessity. This opposition makes clear the great importance of the distinction 
between necessity, duration and choice. Civilizations are always the result of choice, notwithstanding 
their duration. As such, they have a conflictual character: they do not change automatically together 
with the general conditions of development, as do functional imperatives, but have rather a strong 
propensity to preserve themselves, together with their peculiarities. Thus, civilizations constitute an 
important  conservative  factor.  More precisely,  while  they are born from a great  creativity,  which 
provides  a  strong initial  momentum to  their  developmental  processes,  their  inherent  conservative 
tendencies make them subsequently a cause of sclerosis. Functional imperatives, by contrast, refer to 
the whole of societies  characterized by similar  general  conditions  of development.  They have no 
conflicting content, as they express necessity. Functional imperatives assemble nations and individuals 
under the flag of similar exigencies. Moreover, they have no conservative inclination, but express 
rather some functional needs that vary with the general conditions of development. The advent of new 
functional imperatives propels existing civilizations toward extinction and promotes new ones that are  
consistent  with  the  new  functional  imperatives  and,  hence,  more  efficient  and  therefore  more  
competitive (in the new phase of development).   
It is necessary to clarify that their integrating and inner role does not warrant the permanence of the 
grand options and their transformation into the moral duties that E. Durkheim, T. Parsons and some 
other  sociologists  identified  as  a  milestone  of  social  order.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  and  as  utopian 
movements  clearly  show,  grand options may be  the  object  of  rude  conflicts  (mainly  in  modern 
dynamic  societies),  generating  explosions  of  disorder  as  opposed  to  instilling  social  order.  The 
circumstance that the grand options imply choice confers upon them (and, of course, the connected 
social values) an inherent ambiguity.
So the explanation of social order cannot simply hinge upon the integrating nature of ethical rules; it 
requires also the notion of the functional  imperative.  The stabilizing nature of the grand options  
operates through their tight links with functional imperatives.  They may introduce themselves and 
37 It should be noted that the term civilization as so defined means something different than does the term culture. Even 
when this latter term is taken in the wide sense attributed to it by anthropologists, the notion of civilization just given is, still, 
the wider and more stringent one. Of particular importance, the term civilization as so defined expresses better than the term 
culture the imprinting of what I have called ‘grand options’ upon the basic features of the social system, side by side with the 
other basic organizational categories that I denominate functional and ontological imperatives, and avoids mixing with these 
categories.
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resist only if they concord with functional imperatives, primarily those concerning value premises. 
Their strength and limits are due to this dependence, which confers upon them the attribute of necessity 
that warrants their permanence and, at the same time, determines their decay as soon as some long run 
change happens to reveal existing grand options as inconsistent with some functional imperatives. We 
shall discuss – and so elucidate – all this further in the chapter on social and historical development.
The notion of civilization underlines the role and the great importance, for social theory, of value 
premises and choices – therefore, of utopian phenomena that embody the more intensive expression of 
ethical-ideological aspects. On the notion of utopia, our previous analysis sheds some useful insight. 
Utopia may only concern choice.  In this sphere it  can operate  without limits,  violently challenge 
civilization and provoke (or try to provoke) great fractures. It is a primary cause of great qualitative  
jumps. Its fecund power usually emerges after long periods of incubation and often follows some 
strange and tortuous routes. The greatest propulsive strength pertains to the utopia that states some 
ontological imperative and anticipates some future functional imperatives, i.e. as supporting ethical 
principles destined to reveal themselves, in some more advanced phase of development, as necessary 
organizational conditions for efficiency. This kind of utopia can be seen as the scientific equivalent of 
prophecy;  it  possesses  an extraordinary  force and a  great  capacity  to  accelerate  the development 
process.  The Christian prophecy concerning the role and dignity of the individual  (as referred in 
chapter 10) probably constitutes the most important example of this kind of utopia. A closer inspection 
will often reveal these prophecies to be ontological imperatives.
It  is  also important  to  underline the opposite  case of utopia contrasting  with ethical-ideological 
aspects concerning existing or future functional imperatives. Utopia is impotent against these, as they 
represent historical necessity. Therefore, if utopia pretends to unhinge or deny them, it condemns itself 
to certain failure and acts as but a sterile and degenerate phenomenon. The struggle for existence 
among systems will sweep away this  degenerate utopia, notwithstanding the forces sustaining it. It 
may be useful to meditate attentively on the above statements, as the history of utopian movements is 
tragically  marked  by  senseless  confusion  between  the  aspects  of  necessity  and  choice;  with  the 
vicissitudes of communistic utopia acutely underlining the implications of such confusion.
2.3.2 Innovation and choice: the factors of change and their enemies.
The factors behind evolutionary motion are choice and innovation. More precisely, only innovative 
choices generate such a motion. A stationary system (e.g. a stationary economy) carries out choices; 
but these latter, which can be defined as adaptive choices to distinguish them from truly innovative 
choices, express stationary-repetitive motion and, as such, may be explained through some model of 
interaction.
 We classify innovations in relation to two distinct categories.38 On the one hand we have ideological 
and value innovations, which are relative to the sphere of ideas, values, and world views. On the other 
hand we have technological innovations, which in an advanced state of knowledge stem from the 
application of the appropriate sciences to problems of life. In contrast to functional imperatives, these 
aspects of the social system are specific, contingent and reversible. They may be removed or altered 
without  necessarily  violating  rationality  or  organizational  efficiency,  provided  that  one  has  the 
strength, capacity and resolve to do way with the premises (i.e. the specific choices and innovations) 
from which they derive. Of course, they provide some well defined initial hypotheses for deductive 
procedure.
It is important to articulate accurately the position that innovations occupy in the building of theory. 
Theory may explain innovation at the aggregate level, but cannot do so with regard to the specific  
character of innovations, as this depends crucially on creativity, which is unpredictable by definition. It 
38 Naturally, the two types interact; indeed, the same innovation may belong to both categories. Other types of innovations, 
such as radical  and incremental  ones, should be considered; they play a crucial  role in economic modeling (see,  for 
instance, Fusari and Reati 2013; Ekstedt and  Fusari 2010)
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is senseless to try to foresee or explain specific innovations. But this is no reason for alarm. It simply 
is, and all we can do is to recognize the fact. Some of the chief tasks of the social sciences comprise 
ensuring that society is  as open as possible to the infinite  variety of possible innovative choices, 
pointing out their implications and teaching us how to prevent or promptly remedy any de-structuring 
consequent to the advent of the new. The social process is largely described by the interaction between 
two  phases:  the  innovative  dash  and  the  subsequent  structural  organization.  Such  an  interaction 
provides the engine of evolutionary motion.
The  processes  by  which  innovative  choices  mature  are  varied.  They  may  be  conflictual  or 
participatory; they may be propelled by religion, by art or by science, and so on. Factors that put a 
brake on the occurrence of innovations are no less important. Changes in the way in which human 
needs are served, in custom and tradition, in life styles and decisional rules, in the very conception of 
life generated by the appearance of new technologies and new knowledge, cannot and do not impinge 
continuously upon everything and everyone.  Entrenched habits  and customs, especially the  grand 
options, offer powerful resistance to the rise of technological or intellectual innovations that conflict 
with established ways. Although for reasons of efficiency they will eventually give way, arriving at 
that point will be a long drawn-out process involving a great deal of friction and not infrequently 
entailing postponement and only gradual introduction of the new ways. Besides, changes in moral or 
value premises are limited by the fact that they must not contradict those value premises constituting 
functional imperatives. Finally, some technological choices are broader in operational scope and more 
enduring in their effects than others. This applies to fundamental technologies, i.e. those that are an 
essential element of the general conditions of development and whose absence therefore implies that 
the corresponding level of development is unattainable. Such technologies have a vast and enduring 
impact on the social sphere. The well known phenomena of path dependency and lock-in confirm the 
above considerations.
Studying  the  diffusion  and  capacity  for  endurance  of  customs,  traditions,  value  premises  and 
technologies  is  of  the  greatest  importance  and  allows  an  assessment  of  the  friction  and  the 
contradictions that technological developments and other innovations (such as a plan of social reform) 
will have to overcome. 
2.4 Synthesis of the methodological framework. The interrelationships among social subsystems. 
The first and crucial work that must be performed by the method of the social science is the definition 
of rules, procedures and classifications that facilitate the definition of postulates, which latter stand at 
the basis of the process of scientific construction. In particular, the first steps must derive: a) general 
principles  (functional  imperatives)  from  realistic  postulates  not  including  specific  choices  and 
conditions of ideology and technology but concerning very general, significant features of society; b) 
ontological imperatives.  The next steps consist in the identification of the grand value-ideological 
options and the  civilization that they characterize and which govern the society being studied or, in 
utopian constructs, the civilization to which one aspires. The resultant framework can then be enriched 
by  considering  more  specific  aspects  of  reality,  for  instance,  conditions  of  nature.  Hence,  the 
implications of all that on the organization of social system may be deducted. It is important to specify, 
with reference to the forces of evolutionary motion, the interaction between innovation and adaptation, 
as  well  as  the  endogenous  factors  stimulating  innovation,  the  way  social  system  selects  and 
systematizes innovations (or obstructs them), and restores its interior consistency (see chapter 4). 
The requirement that all postulates and deductions must form a consistent theoretical framework 
implies that each step, commencing with the general principles, entail suggestions as to subsequent 
steps and systemic relationships.39 It would be useful to extend the general model to all the subsystems 
39 For example, it must be ascertained that the value premises adopted constitute a consistent set, headed by supreme 
ideals, followed by some other general value premises and, still further down, specific value premises. In other words, each 
norm must be coherent with the overarching system of ideals.
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of society, in order to make explicit the linkages, in the context of social theory, between economics,  
political science, anthropology and sociology. Much more than the natural and logical sciences, social 
theory needs to structure its contents within an overall framework. This for at least two reasons:
Firstly, because the social sciences are not restricted to inquiry into what exists (or the investigation 
of abstract propositions), but are also implicated in the construction of social systems; and this entails 
bearing in mind the interconnections between the various aspects (political, economic, juridical, and so 
on) of the systems, as well as those between normative and positive aspects and between reality and 
ideals. 
Secondly, because the social sciences involve both institutional and non-institutional mechanisms 
that, due to social change, are subject to multiple transformations that radiate from them.  A science the 
aim of  which  is  to  master  this  unstable  reality  must  be fully  aware  of  the  repercussions  on the 
individual subsystems of these transformations, and this awareness can only derive from a unified 
basic method and an organic overview of the society in question.
If the model is accurately built, the differences between it and reality will provide an approximation 
of the difference between spontaneous phenomena and rational-efficient solutions, in the course of the 
gravitational process toward such solutions, based on trial and error. In this regard, it may be useful to 
underline that the study of social phenomena, although unlike the natural sciences in that it is deprived 
of the advantage inherent in the relative constancy of the reality observed, does have at its disposal a 
different,  significant  advantage  which,  properly  exploited,  can  greatly  facilitate  research.  This 
advantage consists in the fact that social studies deal with a reality forged by human beings and thus is 
in theory more readily intelligible to them than is the natural world. But – and this is the key point – it 
is more intelligible, not by virtue of introspection, but because the social sciences, eminently concerned 
as  they  are  with  the  rational  organization  and  administration  of  social  systems  (as  opposed  to 
individual  actions),  must  proceed by deductive procedures  (based,  as noted,  on realistic  and well 
established postulates and on the canon of organizational rationality), which constitute a standard of 
inquiry more rigorous and incisive than that based on experimentation, to which we must necessarily 
resort when the object of study is a reality (nature) not constructed by human beings. But there is an 
obstacle that stands in the way of the work of the social researcher and with which the natural scientist 
needs not contend, namely that social change requires incessant revision of principles and deductions.
The analyses of social researchers are often based on the experiment-verification methodology that is 
appropriate only to the natural sciences; other social researchers rely on deductive procedures that fail 
to develop properly the principle of organizational rationality and, taking reality to mean necessity, 
develop a quintessentially observational character; and others, failing to ensure the realism of their 
postulates, overstep the border and enter the territory of that abstract rationality that is proper to the 
formal-logic sciences.   
2.5 The notion of freedom and necessity areas as an indispensable tool for the understanding of 
function and conflict.
A pivot of the methodological  approach outlined is the rigorous distinction between  freedom and 
necessity in the organization and development of social  systems.  Such a distinction permits us to 
delimit the fields of function and conflict and to overcome functionalist equivocations deriving from 
the erroneous assimilation of necessity to duration.
We saw that in human society, necessity is embodied by:
a) Functional imperatives.
b) Natural conditions and their implications.
c) The basic technological innovations and the organizational forms imposed by them.
Together these categories constitute the necessary conditions for efficiency.
Choice is represented by:
d)  Value-ideological  activity,  headed  by  the  grand  options  (or  choice  of  civilization)  and 
corresponding organizational forms.
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e) All non-fundamental technological solutions and their corresponding implications.
For their part, ontological imperatives stand half way between necessity and choice 
However, we must bear in mind that the range of the choices listed under (d) and (e) is defined by the 
limits of their compatibility with the ideological aspects comprised in functional imperatives.
The necessary conditions for efficiency identify the area of function, while the process of choice  
identifies the area of conflict. Of course, as soon as a value choice has prevailed, it will imply some 
definite  functions:  the grand options and the connected  form of  civilization  require  some precise 
institutions.  But  the  point  is  that  the  value  choices  generating  them may  be  suppressed  without 
damaging efficiency.
The  elements  of  choice  and  the  working  out,  through innovation,  of  man's  creative  capacities 
correspond to freedom in the development of social systems. This freedom is not significantly limited 
by the fact that choice must not contradict necessity as represented by functional imperatives (the 
necessary conditions for efficiency).  This appears evident  when it  is  recognized that  the realistic  
postulates in the general configuration of reality, from which our functional imperatives are derived,  
are generated by the historical accumulation of innovations. In addition, this sedimentation of choices 
and innovations  will  eventually alter  not only the general conditions of development  but also the 
conditioning power of both nature and of the basic technologies themselves, that is,  all the elements  
constituting the aspect of necessity, while the fulfillment of ontological imperatives determines the 
evolutionary strength of the social system.
It might seem that the above considerations darken our distinction between necessity and choice. 
But the point is that a society may not violate functional imperatives, natural conditions and basic 
technologies without seriously compromising its organizational efficiency. These are the necessary 
conditions of efficiency. Unfortunately, the ingrained tendency of choices, especially when they touch 
on the grand options, to take root and vigorously resist revision not infrequently induces people to 
mistake these optional elements for necessities and to give the preference to them over and above those 
functional  and ontological  imperatives  with which  they  are  not  consistent.  To further  clarify  the 
analytic importance of this distinction would require a treatment of social development and historical 
explanation (see chapters 4 and 5).
In social discussion, the failure to separate the merely functional from the ideological, necessity from 
choice,  aggravated by the frequent identification of necessity with duration,  inextricably entangles 
science and faith, thus generating fierce and irresolvable disputes. Operationally, the consequences are 
more harmful still,  for the result is two diametrically opposed tendencies the effects of which are 
simply  devastating  on  the  planetary  scale.  First is  the  tendency,  which  can  be  termed  "pseudo 
reformist",  to reduce necessity to the rank of ideology,  i.e. to substitute value-ideological options, 
mainly grand options and the related civilizations, for the necessary conditions of efficiency.  This 
tendency has inflicted terrible defeats on movements for social reform. Second is the tendency, which 
can be labeled "pseudo-scientific", to raise ideology to the rank of necessity, i.e. to mistake (or pass 
off) value-ideological elements for purely functional necessities, as well as to justify and exalt moral 
choices  for their  alleged purely functional  quality (functionalist  prejudice).  This latter  tendency is 
strengthened by the propensity of optional elements to take root which, together with the axiomatic 
equivalence of reality and necessity implicit in the observational method, confers upon it a seeming 
seal of scientific standing. Confusion here is aggravated by the fact that the character of ontological  
imperatives  stands  half  way between  necessity  and  choice,  thereby  obscuring  the  importance  of 
fulfilling these imperatives.
We have these confusions and theoretical shortcomings – among others – to thank for the fact that 
mankind has steadfastly condemned the just and elevated frauds and impostors. 
2.6   The problem of prediction in the social sciences; from micro to macro theory.
We saw that it is impossible, using the observation-verification method, to derive "laws of motion" of 
the  economy (or  society)  that  can  then  be  used  to  predict  the  future  of  the  social  system.  This 
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impossibility  stems  from the  succession  of  innovative  events  and  consequent  social  change.  To 
forecast future events and social arrangements, we would have to be able to foresee the specific value-
ideological and technological choices and changes that will ensue and derive all their implications. But 
making predictions concerning specific innovations, i.e. acts of creativity, is senseless. We can but put 
forward hypotheses in this regard, and the results obtained by such a procedure will not be predictions 
but merely hypothetical elaborations. This does not mean, however, that the effort to make predictions 
about social reality is useless.
We know that functional imperatives are enduring and that the replacement (or emergence) of grand 
options  requires  the  dismantling  (or  realization)  of  a  vast  system  of  consistent  and  compatible 
arrangements,  propensities,  and so  on,  that  can  only  be  achieved  over  the  very long run.  These 
imperatives and grand options thus trace riverbeds along which social life must proceed and unfold, 
and this facilitates prediction. Furthermore, the formation of functional imperatives and grand options 
by protracted historical sedimentation implies the possibility of recognizing, within a broad margin of 
error,  those new functional  imperatives  and/or  grand options that  are in the process of maturing. 
Moreover, the very notion of ontological imperative provides some basic and enduring knowledge 
about the social  system.  The above knowledge will  furnish far-reaching and in-depth information 
concerning the features of the stage of development on the threshold of which we stand and with 
regard to the main problems that beset it. Reference to basic technological innovations, with their great 
permanence and multiple repercussions, will also help in forecasting future events. Adaptation, for its 
part, embodying as it does a large part of the social process, is in principle foreseeable. Moreover,  
social theory may profitably use the method O-H-Oc with reference to the long lasting aspects related 
to functional imperatives. For instance, the necessity of the entrepreneur in modern societies implies 
that  it  will  be  fruitful  to  conduct  econometric  studies  on  entrepreneurial  decisions  concerning 
innovation, investment and the output level.
It may also be useful to underline that, at the aggregate level, the traditional method O-H-Oc, i.e. one 
based on observation and empirical verification, may sometimes facilitate reliable foresight over short 
time intervals, primarily if the observed reality reflects functional imperatives so that it is not shaken 
by any confusing and sharp gravitation toward them. This reliability of the O-H-Oc methodology is due 
to aggregation that suppresses specific innovations, thus warranting some substantial  invariance of 
structural relations40. Macro theory is able to conjugate, in the investigation of social reality, both the 
O-H-Oc observational  method  (with  its  quantitative  content)  and  deductive  procedure  previously 
discussed and proposed.
Nevertheless, a qualitative gulf separates micro from macro theory; a distance that is not due to the 
choice of a holistic perspective but results simply from aggregation. The dimension of this gulf varies 
according to whether one or other of the two following situations is in operation: a) micro variables 
and macro variables act in the same sense, so that the observation of the latter permits the immediate 
perception of the behavior of the first; b) the behavior of micro variables are not unidirectional and 
they take unexpected directions at the aggregate level. Situation (a) is frequent in the economy (think, 
for instance, of the aggregated and disaggregated functions of demand and supply); in this case, the 
discontinuity existing between the aggregated and disaggregated levels is to be imputed simply to the 
fact that aggregation suppresses particular innovations, on which evolutionary movement depends. But 
the economy also falls under case (b). For instance, the phenomenon of deficiency of effective demand 
may only be expressed at the aggregate level. L. Pasinetti defines as genuinely macro conditions "those 
relations that represent characteristics of the whole economic system",41 and accurately analyzes them. 
Sociologists are acutely conscious of cases falling under (b), for instance, that individual discontent 
does not translate into collective discontent and mobilization.
40    Such an invariant structure permits quali-quantitative mathematical analyses directed to investigate the existence of 
equilibrium, its stability or to point out the existence of strange attractors shaping chaotic areas.
41 See L. L. Pasinetti (1993), page. 49. 
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The true disadvantage of aggregation derives from the fact that the suppression of variables can 
markedly  distort  the  representation  of  reality.  But  this  limitation  goes  hand  in  hand  with  some 
advantages, principally the fact that macro analysis is able to represent some phenomena that micro 
analysis does not perceive, and also the wide spectrum of methodological tools available to macro 
theory. However, the above two fields display complementary roles for the development of knowledge. 
It is important to be conscious of their methodological differences. 
2.7 Economic and social planning 
Economic and social planning and related instruments of reform have roused great expectations on 
a world-wide scale, but have been followed by bitter disillusionment. It may be useful to analyze  
the causes of such unhappy outcomes from the perspective of our inquiry into the method of social 
thought. 
The main cause of the failure of centralized planning has been implicitly set out by our above 
analysis  of  the  ‘necessities’  of  dynamic  economies,  primarily  the  necessity  of  the  market, 
entrepreneurship and related ethical values. Much more difficult is the explanation of the failures of 
economic and social planning in market economies. 
Some important mathematical approaches to planning came to light in the context of the Soviet 
experience,  for  instance  the  linear  programming  of  L.  Kantorovich,  L.  Pontryagin’s  maximum 
principle for the optimal control theory of dynamical systems, and the input-output approach of V. 
Leontief that flourished after this author’s migration to West; but the major usefulness of the first 
two has proved to concern firms’ planning while the major usefulness of the third has been in 
regard to statistical national accounting. The sixties and the seventies of the last century witnessed 
an efflorescence of what can be denominated the programmatic approach, which emphasizes doing 
in  the context  of  economic  and social  planning.  R. Frisch,  J.  Tinbergen,  L.  Johansen played  a 
leading role in the field. Their teaching was concerned by the main lack of constructivism, that is, 
an inclination to disregard  being in the name of  doing;  an issue previously considered but that 
warrants some further discussion. We shall see that economic and social planning offers the best 
grounds for a criticism of the constructivist perspective.  
Many economists  who  lean  towards  the  free  market  have  underlined  the  ingenuousness  and 
abstractions inherent to planning projects. Hayek is associated with some of the most caustic and 
sarcastic  polemics  against  constructivism in  the  name  of  spontaneous  behavior.  Unfortunately, 
Hayek did not understand that  constructivism and spontaneity mutually feed upon one another, 
owing to gaps in both of these schools of thought that allow each to assert itself as the remedy for 
the  errors  of  the  other.  The  more  problematic  of  the  two  is  no  doubt  constructivism,  for  its  
pretension to deviate from spontaneous tendencies infuses heavy error and turbulence into those 
already contained within spontaneous processes, if a science of the organization of social systems 
does not exist.  One major theoretical  consequence of constructivist  errors and ingenuousness is 
represented by the blossoming of the most scientifically consistent kind of spontaneity represented 
by evolutionary social thought, which has expanded its tentacles into a large part of institutional 
thought, notwithstanding the intrinsically constructivist nature of institutional phenomena.42 
The Keynesian discovery of ‘the principle of effective demand’, which was in the air from the 
beginning of the nineteenth century and that, as a matter of fact, must be basically attributed to 
Hobson’s analysis of imperialism, opened the door to an age of great reformist hopes and to a large 
diffusion, in the Western world, of national planning. In fact, during the Great Depression and later, 
the  violation  of  such a  principle  took the  form of  a  deficiency of  demand  and this  suggested 
therapies designed to increase aggregate demand that raised an extensive and attractive possibility 
42 The European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy (EAEPE) provides one of the best instances of the 
attempt to marry evolutionary and institutional thought. This is expressed well, for example, in the convergence of the  
institutionalism of G. M.. Hodgson and the social evolutionism of U. Witt.
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of social reform related to income redistribution, the building of the welfare state, and increased 
public spending. But later bitter disillusion followed, caused by the partiality and one-sidedness of 
the approach and by inherent shortcomings of the diagnosis that will be diffusely considered in the 
last section of chapter 3.
It may seem that the crisis of economic and social planning contradicts our statement that the 
organizational view, which stands at the basis of planning, is appropriate to social reality. We need 
to explain, therefore, why, if our analysis is correct, economic and social planning has failed, the 
consistency of its constructivist  character with social  reality notwithstanding. The explanation is 
that the appropriateness of the vision at the basis of a method is, in itself, insufficient to ensure the 
correct  investigation  and  management  of  the  considered  reality;  some  other  requirements  are 
needed, and these, unfortunately, have often been ignored or misunderstood by social planners. Let 
us investigate this matter more closely.
The vulnerability of planning is primarily derived from a lack of methodological rules allowing  
for the definition of realistic postulates in order to warrant the combination of being and doing and  
make possible the distinction between necessity and choice-possibility. We have seen that in both 
observational  and  spontaneity  positivism,  being dominates  while  doing  is  absent  and  that,  by 
contrast, doing, i.e. the guiding aspect, dominates in social planning. Unfortunately, however, the 
reference  of  planning  to  being,  i.e.  de  facto reality,  is  weak  and  confused;  it  is  this  that  has 
generated  the  abstractness  and  the  unconstrained  constructivism that  are  often  reproved  to  the 
various approaches to economic and social planning. A coherent combination of being and doing 
does  not  exist  in  social  thought,  as  far  as  we know. More  precisely,  we have seen that  social 
thinking  disregards  the  selection  of  realistic  postulates,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  this  is 
indispensable to replace the control and verification of theories based on facts, such verification 
being prevented (as we know) by the non-repetitiveness of observed events. It must be added that 
planning and related  schemes  of  reform constitute  some further  elements  militating  against  the 
hypothesis  of  the  repetitiveness  of  events.  This  makes  it  a  terminological  and  substantial 
contradiction to hinge the (limited) reference of planning to  being on the observational method. 
Notwithstanding, economic and social planning has used strict observation in the attempt to escape 
unrealism,  as  testified,  among  other  things,  by  the  extensive  use  of  econometrics,  which  is  a 
strongly observational science.
The  dissociation  between  reality  and  the  guiding  aspect  is  well  expressed  by the  distinction 
between  economics  (with  its  laws  of  motion)  and political  economy.  In  fact,  the  inductive  or 
deductive experimental procedures typical of positive economics are inconsistent with the guiding 
character  of  political  economy,  since such a  character  (implicitly  constructivist)  contradicts  the 
hypothesis  of  repetitiveness,  which  is  indispensable  to  the  inductive  or  deductive  experimental 
method.  Constructivism,  specifically  the  guiding  character  of  political  economy,  needs,  let  us 
repeat, a non-observational method of inquiry into reality. But economic and social planning has not 
been able to satisfy such a methodological need.
The difficulties and failures of planning can be better understood by returning to the distinction 
between  necessity  and  choice-possibility.  We know from our  proposal  on  method  that  such  a 
distinction derives from the rules of selection of ‘realistic postulates’. The distinction cannot be 
enunciated  otherwise,  for  instance,  through the optimization  models  that  can be considered the 
canonical formulation of planning. In fact, and as seen in section 3 of the previous chapter, the 
distinction between necessity and choice-possibility precedes the logical structure of optimization 
approach. We shall try to further clarify this through some simple considerations.
The optimization principle (taken in Kantorovich, Pontryagin’s etc. forms) is just a mathematical 
technique aimed at improving decision processes. By contrast, the distinction between necessity and 
choice-possibility acts at a much deeper level; it involves the meaning of institutions, ethical values 
and the whole substance of social phenomena. A centralized social system can readily turn to the 
principle  of  constrained  optimization;  in  effect  the  Soviet  reforms  of  the  1960s  trusted  in 
mathematical optimization to recover efficiency, but in vain. Well, the reason for that failure (and 
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others) lay in the ignorance of the central planners of the ‘necessity’ of the entrepreneur, the market, 
etc. On the other hand, the distinction between constraints and objectives in the model of optimal 
choice requires the capacity to discriminate between necessity and choice-possibility. In the absence 
of  such  a  distinction,  substantial  mistakes  can  be  made  in  the  definition  of  constraints  and 
objectives. For instance, utility maximization may be pursued, implying a consumerist vision that 
the modern world should not venture into; furthermore, the objective function may include some 
ethical values inconsistent with opposing values expressing objective necessities.
We should also take note that constraints may include some technologies that do not represent 
necessities  but  only  alternative  choices  to  others.  Even  in  the  theory  of  the  firm,  the  use  of 
constrained optimization does not escape the equivocations caused by the absence of the distinction 
between necessity and choice-possibility. In short, constrained optimization does not remedy (and 
does not consider)  the methodological  problems that  we have scrutinized.  Such optimization is 
different from and subsequent to the procedure and rules of selection of ‘realistic postulates’ and the 
distinction between ‘necessity’  and ‘choice-possibility’  considered previously.  In the absence of 
these rules and distinction, optimization supplies a poor support to programming; as a matter of 
fact, it may cause great misunderstandings.43
Planning projects will become weak and confused in the absence of a rigorous distinction between 
necessity and choice-possibility. As we know, such an absence implies that choice-possibility can 
easily be smuggled in as necessity by people interested in some choice, while necessities that are 
not convenient to dominant classes can be indicated as a matter of choice and hence set aside. This 
will generate heavy inefficiencies, thus leading reform projects to fall into discredit and to fail. Such 
failures  enable  the  adversaries  of  planning  to  proclaim  that  we  must  all  place  our  trust  in 
spontaneous processes. In chapter 1, we saw that the distinction between normative and positive 
side may imply crucial misunderstandings and that such a distinction needs to be replaced by that 
between necessity and choice- possibility. Well, such a replacement is of a central importance with 
regard to programming.
Social  planning and reforms always  present  a  challenge  because reforming actions  invariably 
collide with existing interests and so engender opposition. The almost inert kindness of a lot of 
friends does not counter the rancor and determined opposition of only one enemy infuriated by the 
injury of his interests. If it is not scientifically evident  what must be done and what can be the  
object of mediation, every social plan and proposal for reform is doomed to fail and spontaneous 
tendencies  will  prevail.  More precisely,  planning and reforming action,  if  deprived of scientific 
foundation,  will  succeed  only  if  they  are  able  to  promote  fanaticism or  obtain  the  support  of 
powerful interests. 
The failures of social planning have been mainly caused by the analytical privations considered 
above.  With  significant  exaggeration,  national  plans  have sometimes  been described as  ‘dream 
books’. But if planning is a book it should have been a book with two chapters: one chapter on 
‘necessities’  and  one  on  ‘choice-possibility’,  the  latter  being  a  matter  of  political  mediation. 
Reforms concerning ‘necessity’ should have priority and should never be omitted or postponed. 
What remains may be the object of political discussion.
The confusion between necessity and choice-possibility, between what must be done and what may 
be done, has often caused a deep fracture and contrast between the short and the medium term. 
More precisely, it has favored the advent of critical conditions that have suggested or determined 
short-term measures (monetary, budget and demand regulation policies) thus postponing structural 
reforms. In short, the urgencies of the short run have often been addressed at the expense of their 
structural roots. In this way, political action became the servant of spontaneous tendencies, thereby 
43 F.  Archibugi  has  argued  acutely  against  positive  economics.  His  emphasis  on  the  ‘programmatic  approach’  
highlights the most relevant tools on optimal planning. But this kind of constructivism, which emphasizes doing and  
almost  forgets  being  and  ignores  the  distinction  between  ‘necessity’  and  ‘choice-possibility’,  expresses  a  totally 
unilateral constructivist feature, which is the main reason for the failure of the method of economic and social planning.  
See (F. Archibugi 2007), Preliminary draft, Italian.
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substantially  undermining  reform projects.  It  may be useful to  provide a brief illustration of an 
outstanding failure of economic planning where this is highly necessary, that is, in the presence of 
extensive advanced and backward sectors and areas, as Italian experience shows. 
   Italian planning was largely inspired by the Keynesian teaching. The so called Reference Framework 
of the first national plan used a static Leontief model and the second national plan a dynamic Leontief 
model, thus taking the sectoral final demand as the engine of the economy. Detailed reference, in the 
plan, to the question of the territorial dualism represented merely an addition arranged outside the 
general framework. The industrialization of the South of Italy (almost one half of the country) was 
mainly committed to capital intensive investment by state industries benefiting from high incentives 
irrespective of productive efficiency. This, together with high wages paid by the sectors productivity 
leaders  and aimed at  promoting  mass  consumption  (consumeristic  capitalism)  and at  establishing 
constant prices in those sectors (i.e. avoiding prices declining), did not help the creation of employment 
in the South but, instead, favored a mass exodus from traditional sectors and backward areas, mainly 
agriculture and handicraft, the abandonment of social and residential capital existing in those areas, and 
a parallel shortage of housing and urban congestion in the regions to which migration was directed. 
Only one part of this massive migration from the South found employment in the dynamic sectors of 
Northern Italy. The consequence was a rapid expansion of a ‘refugee sector’ (the retail trade and other 
low productivity sectors with market power, employment in the public administration and other forms 
of  public  assistance).  The  imitational  extension  to  refugee  sectors  of  the  wage  increases  in  the 
advanced sectors, and inefficient public expenditure mainly in the South, fostered a large inflationary 
potential and a growing public deficit and debt, thus obliging the turn to restrictive policies and hence 
pushing the economy toward stagnation.  These absurdities were favored by a diffused Keynesian 
conviction as to the expansionary virtue of demand, whatever its content, that contributed to justifying 
all sorts of waste as useful in order to stimulate growth. Economic and social planning, as largely 
inspired by Keynesian view, did not propose policies to counteract those pathologies that constitute an 
unfortunate inheritance oppressing Italian society and stand at the heart of present day difficulties. 
Such vicissitudes of fortune bear witness to an impressive ignorance of the binary ‘necessity-choice 
possibility’. Some rethinking of the Italian experience of planning was expressed by one of its main 
authors, Giorgio Ruffolo44, but within an overall Keynesian view. 
   A  formal  model  describing  this  case  and  its  vicissitudes,  together  with  some  econometric 
applications, may be found in A. Fusari (1987).    
2.8   Conclusion 
The initial  development of social  theory was heavily influenced by the thought and discussion of 
philosophers. Later, the separation of social from philosophic thought, fully justified by the deviations 
from  scientific  method  generated  by  the  links  between  the  two,  and  the  steady  advance  of 
specialization have led to the progressive narrowing of the scope of social theory. Furthermore, this 
provides an unsatisfactory treatment of the ethical-ideological problem, of the organic-functional and 
conflictual aspects and, more broadly, the distinction between choice and necessity and other related 
issues. The work of three of the most wide-ranging and famous social theorists – Marx, Weber and 
Parsons – fully bears witness to the analytical shortcomings of current social theory. The harm that 
results from this state of affairs, especially in the sphere of the organization and management of social 
systems, is glaringly obvious, and the present tendency is for the situation to be exacerbated.
We have seen in the previous chapter that reliance upon methodology based strictly on observation 
(and in this context it does not matter whether it is deductive or inductive-experimental) entails the 
implicit assumption that everything that happened had to happen and, furthermore, privileges the idea 
of spontaneous process: from the careful observation of reality (conceived of as necessity) one seeks to 
derive scientific "laws" as guides to action. We have also seen that the constructivist  method that 
44 See, G. Ruffolo (1973) Rapporto sulla programmazione, Laterza, Bari
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replaces  the  observation  of  being with  an emphasis  on doing does  not  offer  a  more  satisfactory 
perspective; indeed, we have provided an extensive analysis of the shortcomings of such a method with 
reference to the main ground of its application: economic and social planning. 
The existence of the optional-innovative aspect refutes the validity of the observation-verification 
method. At the same time, it complicates the derivation of general principles. This chapter has sought 
a  way toward  possible  solutions  to  these  methodological  difficulties  and a  way to  remedy the 
failures of constructivism by delineating a proposal on method able to meet those basic features of 
social reality and to marry being and doing in the context of an organizational and realistic perspective 
upon the social sciences.
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